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 Abstract 
Building local organisations for demining is about technology transfer between widely different 
environments. While Norwegian People’s Aid’s demining operations in Mozambique were 
intended to last only for a short period of time, they remained for 13 years. The case presents an 
organisational study of the organisation created in Mozambique and seeks answers to how it 
developed and why it is not likely that an organisational capacity remains. It also elaborates on 
how varying interests among the stakeholders led to changing, vague and unrealisable goals being 
defined. 
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Abbreviations, acronyms and Mine Action 
expressions explained 
Also see Definitions and clarifications in the introduction. 
ADP Accelerated Demining Programme (Also UNADP) 
The UNDP organised demining organisation, which operated mostly in the 
south of Mozambique until 2005. A new organisation with the same acronym 
was started by ex-employees but received no funding. 
CND Commisao nacional do desminagem – same as NMCC (English translation) 
DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance 
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
The removal of the threat posed by explosive objects (UXOs) left behind after 
a conflict. 
Expat, 
expatraite 
Person living abroad, usually in mine action a westerner used as Technical 
Advisor or management positions. 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 
Performs scientific studies and develops standards and guidelines. Several 
former NPA staff work here. 
GoM Government of Mozambique 
GOP General Operating Procedure 
Template for SOPs to use in the field, to be adapted to local conditions. 
HALO Trust British NGO that performed large scale demining in the four north eastern 
provinces or Mozambique from 1993-2007 
HMA Humanitarian Mine Action 
HO Head Office. 
This is used within NPA when the NPA office in Oslo is mentioned. I have 
chosen to use this the same way in this document. 
IND Instituto nacional do desminagem. 
National Demining Institute, taking over as CND is closed. 
LTD Long Term Development. 
The development component of the NPA Mozambique programme. 
MA Mine Action 
Originally denotes the five different approaches to reduce the landmine 
problem: demining, victim assistance, mine risk education, stockpile destruction 
and ban on landmine use. 
MAP Mine Action Programme 
MAU Mine Action Unit 
Refers to the NPA Oslo head office with regards to mine action 
MDD Mine Detection Dog 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Referring to the Royal Norwegian MFA in this document. 
Mine 
Awareness 
Former denomination of MRE 
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 MRE Mine Risk Education 
Educational efforts to sensitise populations living in or moving to areas with a 
mine problem. 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NMCC National Mine Clearance Commission 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. 
NPA  Norwegian People’s Aid 
Ops Off Operations Officer 
Technically responsible for demining operations. 
PARPA Plan de Acção para Reducção de Pobreza Absoluta 
Mozambican national plan to reduce absolute poverty. 
PM Programme/Project Manager  
NPA top responsible for Mine Action in a country. 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
QA/QC Quality Assurance/Control 
Res. Rep. / 
RR 
NPA Resident Representative 
In principle the highest ranking NPA person in the country, in principle 
responsible for both development and mine action. 
RONCO American commercial demining operator. Usually working on behalf of the US 
government. 
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
Detailed instructions for how eg. manual demining shall be performed. 
TA Technical Advisor 
TOR Terms of Reference 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNOHAC UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
This is what later becomes UN OCHA 
UNOMOZ 
aka 
ONUMOZ 
UN Operations in Mozambique 
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
UXO UneXploded Ordnance 
Mines, cluster bombs, bombs, grenades etc. used during conflict that has not 
yet exploded. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
On an overall level the history told in this thesis is about the transfer of technology between and 
the difficulties involved. The creation by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) of an organisation for 
the purpose of demining in Mozambique was about taking a technology1 from a highly advanced 
post-industrial society (“1st world”) and introducing and developing this in a seriously 
underdeveloped, war-ridden and politically unstable country (“3rd world”). On the more specific 
level I will study a case about the creation of one organisation by another organisation. An 
organisation created in order to fulfil a very specific task and what affected the evolution of it. 
This thesis is an attempt to organise and analyse experiences of NPA with regards to the creation 
of capacities in the area of Mine Action. 
1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY 
Whether NPA intended to create and leave a self-sustaining organisation in Mozambique 
is debated. Some say this was never the intention and that the pull-out is just natural since the 
problem it was meant to help has been solved. However, it appears that along the way it has also 
been the intention by some to leave a behind capacities when NPA pulls out, and that some 
stakeholders still have an interest in a continued effort. 
The thesis seeks to relate and analyse how the organisation in Mozambique was 
created, what factors affected its development, and why it was difficult to create a 
sustainable capacity. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Mozambique history in brief 
Mozambique was a Portuguese colony from the 16th century until the Portuguese gave it up in 
1974. During the last ten years of colonial rule, the FRELIMO liberation movement waged an 
unsuccessful liberation war supported by China and the Soviet Union. After independence a one-
party communist state was organised, and the new regime supported liberation movements in 
neighbouring South Africa and Zimabwe (then Rhodesia). The latter resulted in those states 
financing the RENAMO rebel movement which waged civil war lasting until 1992, when both 
                                                 
1 The concrete demining knowledge but most importantly the surrounding organisational structures required for this. 
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parties had lost their external supporters. The country was devastated and ranked as one of the 
poorest countries in the world. During the almost 30 years of warfare, landmines were used 
extensively and indiscriminately by all parties. As peace was declared and stability reached, about 
5.7 million Mozambican refugees and internally displaced persons returned to their homes over a 
period of about three years. One of the methods to prevent a humanitarian disaster was to start 
demining. (Eaton, Horwood, & Niland, 1997a, pp. 1-3; Millard & Harpviken, 2000, pp. 15-26; 
Wikipedia, 2006) 
NPA Mine Action in Mozambique 
Founded in 1939, Norwegian People’s Aid is the humanitarian organisation of the Norwegian 
labour movement. Its international engagement goes back to the highly political support to the 
rebels fighting Franco in Spain in the thirties. 
Based on successful experiences in Cambodia, NPA started demining operations in 
Mozambique in March 1993, as part of the general United Nations peacekeeping operation. It 
was intended to become integrated in general UN long-term efforts, but this did not happen. As 
of 1995 NPA operated more or less independently. From a strong expatriate presence in the start 
it was headed by a local programme manager from 1997 to 2004, only a few international 
advisors remained after 1997. In 1999 a donor report estimated the problem to be solved by 
2006-7 and recommended that NPA should start planning for a phase-out by then. A phase-out 
strategy was not adopted until 2003 and the build-down of the organisation started. From then 
the remaining efforts were geared towards surveying and identification of the remaining problem. 
Operations ended in September 2006, as no more funding was available and NPA plans to end 
all activities by October. At the time of writing it was still unsure if local staff would make a 
serious attempt to create a local NGO. 
Definitions and clarifications 
I use the following definitions in this thesis unless otherwise specified.2
(Humanitarian) Mine Action, in a wider sense the term is used to talk about the five 
activities to fight the landmine problem: Demining, victim assistance, mine risk education, 
stockpile destruction and ban on landmines. Mostly it is used to denote activities to prevent 
accidents by either removing the mines or educating people in affected areas through mine risk 
education. In this thesis it will be used about the removal of mines. 
                                                 
2 The more generally accepted definitions are in the list of Abbreviations, acronyms and Mine Action expressions explained on page iv 
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(Humanitarian) Demining, this is the concrete activity of removing landmines from the 
ground. The term humanitarian is used to distinguish it from military demining, where minimal 
casualties and near 100% clearance rate is not demanded. I will use it alone and to denote the 
activities to remove landmines performed by NPA. 
Nationalised, where used in this thesis I give it the meaning of something taken over by 
Mozambicans; regardless of whether this is connected to the government. 
Independent, in this thesis, when not described otherwise, used to mean independent of 
NPA. Again, independence of the government is not intended unless specified. 
Indigenous, something fully run and managed by Mozambicans. 
Sustainable, something that it is meant to last in the particular environment. Some 
interviewees pointed out the clear contradiction in putting sustainable and humanitarian demining 
together. One should not intend to create sustainable capacities when the problem should rather 
be solved quickly and then there should be no more need for capacities. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
Historical case study 
The case of NPA in Mozambique will contribute answers to some overriding questions regarding 
technology transfer and problems formulated by various actors with regards to mine action, 
development aid and the creation of sustainable capacities.  
While all environments are different, the case can hopefully provide some transferable 
experiences to other mine action programmes. In particular the analysis should be of interest in 
these days, since the NPA Mine Action Unit is planning expansion to several new countries. 
Data collection 
General literature and debates on capacity building and sustainability in Humanitarian Mine 
Action (HMA), as well as specific reports written about HMA in Mozambique, have provided a 
background for the study. The actual research consists of an archive review at the NPA head 
office in addition to interviews with several current and former employees as well as some other 
actors.3  
Most of the interviews, lasting about one hour each, were performed in person at the 
NPA head office. After consent that it would only be for me to hear and transcribe afterwards, 
                                                 
3 An attempt at accessing the archives of the MFA was done in order to if possible find documents with regards to former policy 
with regards to HMA in Mozambique. However it was made clear from the switchboard that access was very limited and no 
answer was given what so ever after requests to the archivist. 
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the interviews were recorded and the audio files stored. From an original plan of 6-8 interviews 
the scope increased to 19 interviews.4
I used a loose interview guide which would start with an open question about “why is 
there no organisation left when NPA leaves Mozambique”? Unfortunately, I often made the 
interviewees feel that I said that the NPA operation in Mozambique had been a failure. Most did 
not agree to this, the general view was that NPA solved a serious problem in Mozambique. And 
that the main reason for no organisation being left behind is that there is no use for it. At the end 
of the interview a presentation was done of the preliminary theories of why NPA had not 
succeeded in creating an independent entity in Mozambique, divided in the five organisational 
elements described in chapter 2. Feedback was sought on each point even if they had somewhat 
been mentioned by the informant in the first part of the interview. 
The assessment of the two first years of the programme is based on evaluations and 
considerations presented in monthly reports to the NPA HO. These have not been referenced 
each and every one, unless direct quotes are used. Thereafter quarterly reports found have made 
the background together with interviews. All reports and other relevant NPA archive information 
providing the background for the history have been collected in two chronologically sorted 
folders together with the transcribed interviews. 
An early version of the historical chapter was sent to the informants for feedback and 
review, the same was done with a draft of the full thesis. Comments were included as far as 
possible and content considered too sensitive by some, was removed or rewritten. 
Factors affecting the study 
There are limitations I see to this study: 
With limited time and finances it is based on available personnel and material in Oslo.5 
Preferably more local staff and other actors involved with NPA in Mozambique could have been 
consulted.6 Having only a vague understanding of culture in Mozambique I have not been able to 
see where Norwegians might have misunderstood local culture. 
There was a noted reluctance by informants in mentioning “negative” histories, in 
particular related to personnel. This was discovered as I reviewed archive material, or talked to 
people remotely involved. The complete picture was established upon request in some cases. 
While I have chosen not to tell those stories in full detail and omit some completely, they do 
                                                 
4 See Interviews for a list of persons interviewed and consulted. 
5 With the exceptions of the long time local Programme Manager and the current local deputy. 
6 Such as the UN, government and one former NPA resident representative. 
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form part of the general picture of the organisation. I do suspect that other themes of relevance 
can have been left out, but do not believe it would have made the analysis very different. 
The NPA Oslo archives are not complete. While much help was provided by their 
archivist in finding existing material, it is clear that archiving over the years has depended on the 
individual desk officer. Archive material from the first couple of years (after some compiling 
from different parts of the archive) provided a good background. It is feared that with the change 
from fax to e-mail that much less archiving was done. 
My background in NPA should be noted as it has influenced the research in both positive 
and negative ways. The informants are mostly people that I have known for years and many 
whom I have a friendly relationship with. This can have led to me being more “friendly” in my 
questioning and reluctant to push for or relate difficult issues. On the other hand it also means I 
had their trust. They were probably more free in their communication and have volunteered 
more information than they would have done to an outsider. Several of the informants appeared 
not to have discussed their involvement with anyone in depth before. My interviews became a 
way to “confess”, which meant that I had to caution myself in what parts could go in as part of a 
public history and not. 
Within the limitations of this thesis and my background, I have chosen not to enter into 
wider political discussions about geopolitical interests and neo-colonialism. While this might be 
seen to have an effect on the goals and power distribution which will be discussed later, it was 
considered to be beyond my scope. 
1.4 DISPOSITION OF THE THESIS 
The document is divided into three main parts: First a presentation of the framework which will 
be used for the analysis, Elements of Organisations. Second, chapter 3 gives a chronological review 
of the case and the findings. Third, chapter 4 contains the analysis of the empirical material, 
where I also present further comments on the case conveyed by the informants and go in depth 
on some incidents related in chapter 3. At the end there is a conclusion where I summarise the 
findings and suggest some further areas to study. 
The empirical chapter is long and contains little explanation of the history related, but 
serves to draw conclusions in the analysis with regards to the development over time. 
Appendix 1 was a document used by the author to keep track of various events and 
participants involved in the organisation. It has been partly anonymised and included to give the 
reader an idea of the changes of personnel. However, it is not intended to be exact nor is it fully 
correct. 
 

Chapter 2 
2 A framework, Elements of Organisations 
The study is about the technology transfer occurring in the case of NPA in Mozambique. To 
order the factors that influenced the process I will use the framework developed by Richard Scott 
in Organisations, Rational, Natural and Open systems (2003).7
 
The primary elements of organisations can be defined as: 
• Social Structure, the rules or structures for interaction in an organisation.  
Scott groups the social structure into three components:  
a. Normative structure, being the values (criteria for selecting behaviour), norms (rules 
for e.g. how goals can be pursued) and role expectations (expectations or 
standards for behaviour of the participants).8 
b. Cultural-cognitive structure, shared beliefs and understanding about the situation by a 
majority of the participants. 
c. Behavioural structure, how the participants actually behave. 
• Participants, the individuals that for one reason or another take part in the organisation.  
• Goals, desired ends for the organisation. 
• Technology, what the organisation knows and “sells” either in terms of physical gear, 
knowledge and skills; or with simple words: “what it does” and ultimately produces. 
• Environment, the situation, in which the organisation operates, relates and must adapt to in 
order to succeed.  
 
In the following figure (based on an original illustration made by Leavitt) Scott illustrates how all 
the different elements interrelate – and in particular all relate to the environment. 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that Scott only gives a presentation of theories discussed by others in the field of organisation theory, he does 
not as such present a clear theory of how to understand and tell why things go well or not. I have chosen to use parts of it, as I 
say, as a framework in order to systematize and attempt to understand the factors that have been at work in NPA in 
Mozambique. For a deeper understanding of the various factors a more profound study of the theories he present would be 
merited. 
8 Norms are often thought of as unwritten rules, in this context normative structure includes written and formal rules. 
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Environment 
 
Social 
Structure 
Technology Goals 
Participants 
Organization 
Figure 2: Leavitt's Diamond: A Model of Organisation (as adapted by Scott) 
 
2.1 WHAT COULD WE EXPECT TO FIND ACCORDING TO THEORY? 
Organisation theory tries to give answers to what factors affect the evolution of organisations. In 
this thesis the framework provides a way to systematise and analyse the various factors that 
affected the establishment of the organisation. By this it serves as a method to explain why the 
organisation has not become a sustainable capacity. 
Social structures 
The establishment and imprinting of common values, norms and roles are important; and more 
so if the organisation is large. Divergences between this normative structure and the actual way 
people behave (the behavioural structure) is normal in most organisations. But too big 
divergences can be a problem. If the managers give one instruction but act in a different way, it 
will be hard to have the employees follow the said thing. It can also be a problem for an 
organisation if its members have too widely differing interpretation of themselves, the other 
members and the organisation itself. If the cultural background is very different among the 
participants, it can be hard to imprint a new structure. 
To what extent the social structure is formalised, affects the organisation. If the structure 
is only loosely defined, the exit or entry of participants will lead to their personality defining their 
positions in the organisation and possibly the structure itself (pp. 18-20). 
Participants 
Participants can be widely defined as all individuals that somehow contribute to the organisation, 
i.e. not just the employees. To use a terminology that is often used in development and Mine 
Action theory: all stakeholders to the organisation. As just mentioned under social structures, in a 
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more informal social structure the participants will influence more on the organisation. The 
characteristics of participants, their goals and their contributions to the organisation are 
important in forming the social structure, just as well as the social structure established affects 
the participants. Which way the influence is stronger has been debated. I will assume there is an 
influence both ways and that this has an effect on the organisation. (Scott, 2003, pp. 21-22) 
The availability, inclusion and personal development of participants will be important for 
how an organisation is created and later evolves. 
Goals 
Goals, policies or strategies, and understanding how they are defined, are vital in the study of 
organisations. To systematise goals Scott defines five uses of goals in organisations:  
• Cognitive 
Goals provide criteria for the generation and selection of courses of action as well as 
give directions and constraints for decisions and actions. 
• Cathetic 
Providing motivation and identification for the members of the organisation. 
• Symbolic 
Goals to influence the environments of the organisation such as local communities, 
national governments and donors 
• Justificatory 
As a means to justify the behaviour of the organisation. 
• Evaluative 
As a means to evaluate whether the organisation is successful. 
 
Quite often the goals will be different depending on what level of the organisation is approached. 
The employees on the ground will see quite different goals from the top level managers. There 
will also be a difference between the intended, emergent (what comes up anyway) and realised goals. 
And certainly the goals will change over time.  
Who defines the goals to actually be followed in an organisation is an important question. 
And, to most scholars in the field, this has been seen as a continuous battle for power among the 
internal and external stakeholders. Scott proposes the theories by Cyert and March about 
Dominant Coalitions as a sensible approach to evaluating the powerplay. They say that 
organisations are composed of coalitions of stakeholders that pursue similar interests. One group 
or one individual seldom has full control. Everybody have to seek out other stakeholders, with 
coinciding interest, that have power and negotiate agreements over goals. 
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Asymmetry in power between the ones defining the goals can often lead to differentiated 
power structures. This will be relevant in a case where one stakeholder receives everything from 
others and is fully dependent on them. 
The absence of clearly specified goals is often caused by an unstable environment. This will 
make it difficult to both design a structure and establish goals for the participants. In such cases a 
more temporary organisation setup might be preferable to a fixed, long-term one.  
(pp. 22, 292-309) 
A lot more theory about goals, power and control is certainly relevant for this case. I have 
only touched the surface of what is discussed by Scott and others. 9 Since the intention of this 
study is a mere superficial presentation I will not go further here. 
Technology 
Technology focus in organisation theory is about looking at the organisation as a place where 
input is transformed into output. It is defining technology as not just about converting 
something physically (like removing mines from the ground and making it safe) but it could also 
be about contributing to someone’s education or making their life better. Technology is here 
interpreted as both the machines possessed, the knowledge, skills and methods as well as the 
required organisation of the participants in order to obtain the output. 
Internal and external environments shape the technology in use and vice versa. While an 
organisation might attempt to buffer its core technology from too much uncertainty in the 
environment, it is also fully dependent on the environment for the continued development of its 
technology. Seldom will an organisation invent and develop its technology alone. Three 
dimensions can be used when we evaluate the technologies of an organisation and see how they 
affect the structure. 
• Complexity or diversity. How many elements must be handled simultaneously? 
The more complex technology the more complex the structure. 
• Uncertainty or unpredictability. How well can the outputs be predicted? 
With less certainty a less formal structure and decentralisation would be expected. 
• Interdependence. To what extent will the technologies in use affect each other? 
With more and interdependent technologies higher demands for coordination would 
be expected. 
                                                 
9 Some issues would be the relevance of culture; endorsed and authorized power; intended, emergent and realized strategies; and 
theories on how organisations lacking clear goals tend to act. 
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With an increase in all these three dimensions, we should see either a reduced need for (by 
lowering performance standards) or an increase in the capacity for information processing in the 
structure. (pp. 23, 230-261) 
Environment 
Environments on several levels are vital for the possibilities of an organisation to develop at all, 
how it develops and for its survival. As has been evident from the presentations above, the 
environment is important for all the other organisational elements.  
• The social structure will often reflect or be borrowed from the environment, much of 
the order or disorder within an organisation will be reflecting the environment. 
• The participants available to the organisation and their previous socialisation and 
training depend on the environment. 
• With regards to the goals – Scott provides a reflection on this by Parsons from 1960 
saying that “what is termed a goal […] is, from the point of view of the larger society, 
its [the organisations] specialised function. An organisation may thus expect societal 
support for its activities to reflect the relative value society places on those functions” 
(p. 23) 
• Which Technologies are viable to use and not will depend on the environment. If the 
environment around is weak, it might be hard for an organisation to support the use 
of a complex technology that requires certain structures in the society at large.  
 
In an environment just emerging from decades of war, competition for available resources is 
expected and there will most likely be a high rate of corruption. The initial resources available will 
affect the structure of the organisation. As organisations often tend to be imprinted with their 
first structure, this will define the future of the organisation. 
While organisations will be influenced by the environment, influence also goes the other 
way. Organisations can have an impact on their environments. 
Summary and expectations for NPA Mozambique 
None of the organisational elements can explain separately what an organisation is, how it is 
created and evolves. In order to understand the whole picture, factors within all these elements 
need to be reviewed to see how they affect each other and contribute to the organisational whole. 
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I will here list some assumptions with regards to a demining organisation in Mozambique 
and factors affecting the various organisational elements.10
Social structure 
• Initial rigid social structure in order to handle difficult environment gets “imprinted” and 
influences the organisation later on. 
• Social structure imposed by Norwegians which is not in the area. Need to do basic 
training to establish. 
• Loosening of the original social structure when expatriates leave or diminish in numbers. 
Participants 
• Few educated or trained persons available locally. 
• Other actors in the environment competing for qualified participants. 
• Expatriates: Military trained, action oriented, lack of cultural sensitivity leading to 
problems. 
• External: UN, Donors, Government, Other authorities, “Clients” having different 
motivations. 
Goals 
• Rapidly changing environment leads to problems in defining goals. 
• Goals are established as “they go” on the ground without a clear overall policy. 
• Changing actors, internal and external, leading to frequent redefinition of goals – 
changing dominant coalition. 
• Local staff establishing and influencing goals in order to preserve employment. 
• Expatriate staff having other goals than the local staff. 
Technology 
• Military technology leading to military structure and military goals. 
• New technical field influencing the goals of the organisation and creating ambiguities. 
• Desire to develop new technologies by internal and external actors leading to 
organisational complexity. 
• Changing environment leading to changing and more complex technology. 
Environment 
• Rapidly changing environment as the country goes from war, to reconstruction and later 
to development. 
• First phase with abundance of funds, followed by other phases where less funds are 
available and goals that “sell” have to be established. 
• Environment not favourable for large organisations. 
• Corruption. 
                                                 
10 Table 1: Organisational elements and factors in the different phases synthesises the actual findings in a similar way. 
 
Chapter 3 
3 NPA Mine Action in Mozambique review 
For the analysis of the case I will present a chronological review of the programme. The review 
focuses on the first years of establishment and nationalisation of the programme. From the last 
years of the operation I only present highlights of relevance to the analysis performed later on. 
This is not an attempt at a full historical review. It is intended to single out events and stories that are 
relevant to the destiny of the organisation and form a background for the analysis. 
The overview has been divided into four main periods: Emergency, when NPA first arrives 
on the ground and works as part of the peacekeeping operations, on behalf of the United 
Nations; Nationalising, where all efforts are made to phase out expatriate staff and establish a 
nationalised management; maturation, where the nationalised NPA Mozambique works with 
minimal NPA supervision; phasing out, in this period it becomes clear that donors will no longer 
fund the operations, and a gradual downscaling occurs.  
The illustration on the following page (adapted from an original created by the GICHD) 
illustrates the need for different kinds of demining approaches in the various phases occurring in 
Mozambique as a whole. It also gives a good presentation of some of the main events in the 
country that affected the development of the organisation. 
“Sustainable Capacities” 
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3.1 EMERGENCY PHASE – 1993-1995 
Preparation, January – June 1993 
The Mozambican peace accord was signed in October 1992 and the United Nations moved in 
with peacekeeping forces to oversee the peace accord and stabilise the country while it prepared 
for general elections in 1994. NPA, after success with their demining operations in Cambodia, 
sought new areas of operation and identified Mozambique as a potential. After discussions with 
the Norwegian embassy in Maputo, initial plans were made and the UN contacted. This resulted 
in a formal request already in January 1993 for NPA to start operations in Mozambique. 
(Interview 19; 23)11
The UN Mine Action plans for Mozambique rephrased by NPA in 1993 were to 
establish: 
• A demining school after the Cambodian model, a Mine Clearance Training Unit 
(MCTU) 
• A UN structure for demining operations in Mozambique. 
• A National Demining Structure/Mozambican Mine Agency Centre to carry on 
demining activities when the UN leaves. 
• A Prioritized Mine Clearance Plan to ensure 
o clearance routes for food relief 
o routes to assembly and demobilization areas with admin support 
o routes for refugee return from abroad 
o clearance of villages, access roads and rural areas for resettlement 
(Nikolaisen, Bjarkøy, & Hoksnes, 1993) 
 
NPA had been on the ground in Mozambique since 1986 with a relief and development 
programme. The organisation was asked to take on the creation of Emergency Demining Units 
and as a secondary objective to contribute with instructors to the demining school. The purpose 
was to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe as the refugees started returning and it was suspected 
that parts of the return routes were mined. At the same time the capability of the UN to establish 
demining operations within an acceptable timeframe was doubted by the donors. Based on the 
                                                 
11 The request came from UNOHAC (now UN OCHA), which was then in charge of the Mozambique UN peace keeping 
operation (UNOMOZ). Frequently history of NPA and Mine Action in Mozambique starts with NPA being requested to 
come, excluding the NPA initiative. 
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experience with NPA in Cambodia, it was assumed (even by the UN) that NPA would be a more 
capable organisation.12
An NPA fact-finding mission (consisting of one development expert, one HO 
representative and one technical person from the Cambodia demining programme) to assess the 
possibilities and requirements for an NPA operation, was performed in late January and early 
February 1993.  
The NPA mine action operations were to go in as a part of the general UN effort. The 
funding applications sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that “the 
project will be implemented in close cooperation with UNOHAC, UNOMOZ and forms part of 
the other UNDP/UNOPS projects”. (Hoksnes, 1993b, p. 1[my translation]) Financially the cost 
was to be split between the UN and the MFA. NPA obtained funding from the MFA, (while UN 
financing was still unsure) and estimated in the first application that the duration of the project 
would be until the end of 1994.  Due to the uncertainty of UN financing, a second application 
was sent one month later, funds to be returned when or if the UN funding is received. The total 
budget for the project in 1993 was of NOK 12.823.800. 
The plan in brief was to create a seven man force of Norwegian military personnel, 
building on the experienced staff from the NPA operations in Cambodia.13 These would go to 
Mozambique, train demobilised soldiers. Later they would be supervisors for these, and be 
joined by three additional Norwegians once operations started. Further plans are not mentioned 
in the first two applications. 
NPA undertook a second fact-finding mission at the end of March. The objectives were 
to find counterparts in the country and work out agreements and objectives. All operations 
should be in cooperation and accordance with the UN structures, but there was reluctance to 
wait for the UN. It became clear that the original objective of using demobilised soldiers from 
both parties in the conflict would have to be postponed because RENAMO was delaying 
demobilisation. At this mission NPA was also requested by the UN to start a mine risk education 
(MRE) programme in neighbouring Malawi14 where the largest numbers of refugees were 
located. The aim of this was to prevent casualties when they started returning. 
Tete, the capital of Tete province, was after some considerations chosen as the 
operational base for the demining; mainly because UNOHAC and UNHCR estimated that the 
                                                 
12 The UN itself was quoted: “To put it with Mr. Patrick Blagden’s [chief coordinator for demining operations in UN, New York] 
words: ‘Don’t let us down. We (i.e. UN) relay [sic] on you’. ” (Nikolaisen et al., 1993) 
13 Later on personnel was also recruited from Sweden and Britain 
14 Mine Awareness, or lately named Mine Risk Education, consists of activities to inform people of the dangers of mines in order 
to avoid accidents, often cited as the most cost effective element of Mine Action. 
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province would be an area of great influx of returning refugees. That the existing NPA office 
was also located there was more of a coincidence. (Interview 18) 
NPA started preparing on the ground directly after the second fact-finding mission. The 
UN was supposed to provide NPA with most of the logistical items for the operation (such as 
visas and access of NPA staff to the country), which did not happen. 15 Some of the delays were 
due to political issues of the peace process, but others appear to have been caused by mere 
tardiness in the UN system. 
Operations start, July – October 1993 
The international NPA team was gathered in early June and started preparing for operations 
which were continuously delayed by UNOHAC. At the end NPA disregarded UNOHAC 
instructions and reached agreements with FRELIMO and RENAMO. They also got approval 
from the MFA to start training deminers, even if RENAMO had not yet started demobilisation 
(which was the crucial point for the UN). 
Training finished in mid August and demining started towards the end of the month 
after heavy pressure by NPA on the UN for a go. Neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO seemed 
too concerned, but agreed that demining should start. Mine risk education trainings started up in 
refugee camps in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa around the same time (Interview 
18). 
In the setup phase there was close cooperation between the existing NPA development 
programme. However, in some cases the demining team chose other ways to work locally. The 
cooperation seems to have been mostly on the top level and after a while the new operations set 
up separate offices due to space constraints. One early expatriate supervisor said in interviews 
that “I didn’t know there was another NPA in Tete until several months after I had arrived”. 
(Interview 21) 
NPA worked hard to obtain maps of minefields from local military personnel and also 
performed reconnaissance of their own to define what areas to work in. In some areas they were 
able to collaborate with or employ former officers to use on reconnaissance missions. 
In September and October the NPA demining operations received a lot of media 
attention which among others lead to a discussion of and change of demining priorities by the 
UN. This was a result of information given by NPA after reconnaissance work in the border 
areas found that not only mined roads are an issue but also mined fields. NPA started to plan for 
                                                 
15 The UN delayed to sign the agreement for several months, it was not signed until 14 June after repeated NPA requests and 
pressure from the Norwegian MFA. The agreement became crucial for the NPA team to be allowed entry in the country. 
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an expansion of the project in order to handle the large areas found to be mined. Mines were not 
laid densely, but over huge areas meant. A larger effort was therefore needed. The plans were to 
increase to some 300 deminers starting training by late 1993, in order to “cover the immediate 
need within a two-years period” (Bach, 1993, p. 2). 
Some expatriate staff was changed early in the programme, apparently for personal 
reasons, while some of the local staff was fired or left of free will. 
Planning for the future and expanding, November 1993 – January 1994 
In November 1993 NPA sent a funding application to the MFA for the period 1994-1995 
applying for NOK 31.216.000 and a considerable expansion of the programme. This was the 
first time (found in the archives) that NPA in writing put forward a longer timeframe for its 
demining project and formulated an NPA “concept” of demining: 
[…] the NPA concept of demining is based on the need for immediate clearance of mined 
areas related to the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. However, countries like 
Cambodia and Mozambique will have to struggle with the mine problem for many years 
to come. Another principle objective in the NPA mine clearance concept is therefore the 
transfer of expertise to local personnel and to establish a structure enabling them to cope with the mine 
problem in the long run. In Mozambique the first phase of the project is the training of local 
deminers and the subsequent demining under expatriate supervision. The second phase of 
the project is the training of local supervisors and the demining under local supervision 
combined with expatriate monitoring of the demining activities in the field. The third 
phase of the project is the transfer of administrative functions to the local structure. The 
NPA mine clearance project therefore has the character of both responding to an 
emergency situation and dealing with the mine problem in the long run. To reach the 
objectives the expatriate involvement of the mine clearance project needs a time frame of about 2-3 
years.  
(Hoksnes & Hansen, 1993, p. 1[my emphasis']) 16
This formulation was repeated in what seems to be the first NPA policy paper on 
demining: “The Norwegian People’s Aid involvement in mine clearance” where the NPA also 
offers its assistance in demining services to “...any area of the world within our capacity” 
(Hoksnes, 1993a, p. 5). The approved expansion in Mozambique stipulated an increase to 21 
expatriates and 270 local deminers. Also this time the UN was supposed to pay a share of the 
cost. But the support of the Norwegian MFA was still required in order to advance the necessary 
funds.  
                                                 
16 The true objectives here and what was written and what was meant within NPA greatly varies among the informants. Håvard 
Bach means that the intention was never to create a local organisation without NPA control. Halle Jørn Hansen says that 
creating local organisations was important. Eva Håland says that creating an organisation was against the principles of NPA 
and might have been thought about by the MA guys but never seriously considered by NPA as a whole. Håvard Hoksnes, who 
most likely wrote the document, does not feel that he took part in NPA discussions about building a local capacity (Interview 
11; 12; 18; 19). See p. 50 and “ ” for a discussion of the varying NPA goals.  Norwegian People’s Aid
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As a result of the expansion plans, the team was reorganised and also started to use some 
of the local staff for more senior positions. NPA started recruiting and training the new 
deminers already in November. The addition of another batch of new recruits was reported to 
lead to “repeated changes of organisation and missions” (Bach, 1994, p. 1[My translation]) but all 
the same demining proceeded well. Originally the UN was supposed to be training these new 
recruits but delays again occurred. In January, NPA started discussing with the UN how they 
could educate local supervisors, in order to reduce the amount of expatriates. 
On the ground they spent a lot of time clearing areas that appeared to have been de-
mined already, this lead to NPA questioning the priorities set by UNHCR and they suggested 
some changes. Particularly since road clearance, which had top priority by UNHCR, had often 
been done on roads with few or no mines which caused lowered deminer morale. In this period 
the first serious mine accident occurred and one local deminer lost his life. 
In Mozambique the two parties to the conflict finally approved A mine clearance plan for 
Mozambique which had been proposed earlier in the year by the UN. Among the needs identified 
was a survey to identify the extent of the problem. The survey was performed by HALO Trust at 
the beginning of 1994, but covered only parts of the country.  
In December and January discussions started with regards to the possibility of an NPA 
expansion to Angola and also the employment of a demining expert at the NPA office in Oslo. 
Consolidating the new force, February – March 1994 
The training of new deminers continued all through February and March, finally bringing the 
force up to the planned six platoons or close to 300 (of which eight were women)17. In meetings 
with UNOHAC and UNHCR it was estimated that the NPA programme “would at least be 
implemented up till the end of 1995”. The UN had some concerns about the future of the 
personnel trained by NPA and desired that they should “be absorbed into local structures when 
such structures are in place”. They estimated that this would be in place from 1996. Whether 
NPA should be assisting in the creation and management of the operational part was for the first 
time discussed and NPA agreed to formulate a proposal. NPA also agreed to organise mobile 
demining units to be available in other areas than the Tete and Sofala provinces. (Nikolaisen, 
1994a, p. 2) 
In February a routine of monthly mine action coordination meetings was established, 
gathering the UN and other main actors such as NPA, HALO Trust and Ronco. Still NPA 
received tasks from the UNHCR to open up roads where they found few or no mines at all. 
                                                 
17 This might have been the first time in the world that female deminers were enrolled in UN operations. 
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Plans were made to ensure that all deminers at regular intervals cleared areas where they actually 
found mines or have refresher trainings in order to maintain good routines. 
Work with the UN to establish training of supervisors was also undertaken. NPA was 
reluctant to speeding up the promotion of existing personnel to educate supervisors. They 
needed more experience to become supervisors and removing experienced, well qualified 
personnel was seen to weaken the existing structure. NPA hoped for additional trained personnel 
from the UN demining school. In the end the establishment of the UN Mine Clearance Training 
Center (MCTC) in Beira was delayed and supervisor training estimated to start in 
October/November, something NPA saw as too late. So, for the first time, NPA established 
local staff as supervisors in two of the demining groups. Another concern aired by NPA about 
the MCTC was that UNOHAC had no clear plans for employment of the deminers trained.18
From March the NPA programme started reporting to a new technical expert in Oslo.19 
Some expatriates ended their contract and some moved over to the mine awareness programme. 
Funding for the NPA operations remained an issue; within the UN there were constant 
discussions over whether UNOHAC or UNHCR should be funding the “local component” of 
the programme. 
Taking a lead role or not? April – July 
In April NPA handed in its proposal to UNOHAC for a Feasibility study on Mozambican take-over of 
demining operations after international NGOs and commercial companies have withdrawn. The document 
estimated that the international presence “may withdraw within a year or two”; the importance 
of putting Mozambique in a position to take charge was seen as essential. The total time for 
Mozambique to solve its mine problem was calculated to 7-10 years; NPA was asked by the UN 
“to identify [...], or if necessary to establish [an autonomous] Mozambican entity that may take 
over the responsibility of demining operations [...] to be established by the end of 1994, and 
hopefully be operational locally at the end of 1995” (Nikolaisen, 1994c, p. 1). The focus in the 
Terms of Reference was on studying existing structures to see how the planned structure could 
fit in, both through identification of priorities and the needs on different government levels. It 
also referred to possible logistical conditions for such a structure, once the international presence 
had left and the current logistics would “fall apart” (p. 3). Local UN personnel, as well as donors 
in Mozambique, were positive to the idea. But in June it became clear that there was scepticism 
                                                 
18 The UN had a plan and funds to train some 1200 deminers but no funds or plans for how they would be employed afterwards. 
The training plan was later reduced to 450 deminers. (Interview 18) 
19 A person originally intended for the programme in Angola was chosen for this position. (Interview 17) 
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to the idea at the UN headquarters in New York. In the end, the feasibility study was not 
performed due to lack of funding (Interview 18). 
At the NPA Head Office there was debate over the division between the Operations 
Section and the rest of the organisation. The head of International Department considered that 
the Operations Section distanced itself too much, both physically and mentally, from the 
“mother organisation”. (Interview 19) 
In the field, operations progressed well and transfer of leadership to local staff was 
prioritised. However, the old issue of clearing areas with few or no mines continued. Also, due to 
fewer inputs on demining priorities from the UN, NPA increased surveying and planned to 
define priorities on its own and report them to the UN. NPA convinced the UN to move its 
training centre from Beira to Tete, taking advantage of NPA’s already established training 
facilities. Albeit some delays this was completed in July. 
3-4 of the expatriate staff ended contracts and were changed. Among the new arrivals 
was a new deputy programme manager as the former left for the new Angola demining 
programme in September, the programme manager was to follow in 1995. 
Turned down by the UN, August – December 
In August a UN representative arrived in Mozambique with the mandate to create a national 
Mine Action Center - MOZMAC. Neither UNOHAC in Maputo nor NPA appeared to have 
received information about this in advance. NPA still contributed serious resources to the 
planned MOZMAC and assisted the UN in several ways. However it was still uncertain what role 
NPA would have. In general NPA found it hard to plan and coordinate with the UN. Particularly 
as the plan finally proposed by the UN in September greatly differed from what had been 
discussed. The change also created strong reactions from the donors in the country. They 
actually refused to fund the UN initiative.  
The UN operations started gradually to dissolve as the UNOHAC mandate was 
supposed to terminate at the end of the year. It was not yet clear if UNDP or another UN entity 
would take over responsibility for UN Mine Action in the country. This had consequences for 
NPA in terms of both logistics and uncertainty about future funding of the operations.  
In October NPA HO received a formal request from the UN to submit a proposal For 
the provision of Management Infrastructure for the Mozambique Demining Program. Formally NPA declined 
to hand one in, due to a five day deadline from the day the request was received. In interviews 
NPA actors have indicated that this was also because the UN had changed the original terms too 
much. By November it was clear that the UN no longer intended to use NPA as the 
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implementing partner. They decided to take care of the creation of the national demining entity 
themselves (Nikolaisen, 1994b). A national demining commission was established, but did not 
become operational until much later and was then considered non-functional by most parties. 
UNDP, which was in charge of establishing the new entity, made plans to establish a new 
demining organisation called ADP (Accelerated Demining Programme) in the south of 
Mozambique. Due to donor discontent and distrust with the UN, the central organisation 
received a much weaker mandate than the corresponding structure in Cambodia. NPA 
considered whether its efforts should be continued as a standalone operation or be merged with 
the UN effort. Even if NPA saw it as beneficial to have a joint mine action effort, the national 
structure did not seem strong enough yet. 
The perspective, with two alternatives in Mozambique, was formulated as part of a travel 
report by a NPA HO staff member in December: 
A. The NPA project will by the end of 1995 become integrated with the UN 
monitored unit whereas NPA will basically pull out. 
B. The NPA project will not become integrated under the same management 
whereas NPA will have to continue monitoring the project for a while with the 
perspective of establishing a separate Mozambiquan [sic] demining organisation 
in Northern Mozambique 
(Smedsrud, 1994, p. 3) 
Fortunately in this period the UN managed to get its training centre running, and from 
November NPA took part in the training of local supervisors. Participation ensured NPA quality 
control in the training but it also meant that NPA temporarily had to do without several 
expatriate staff in its own programme. 
A policy document by NPA from November 1994 stated under NPA Mine Programme 
Concept: “Competence Transfer: ... The aim is to enable the cooperation partner to run its 
own programme, with the assistance of at most one or two expatriate technical advisers after a period of 
two or three years [my emphasis]”. In the same document it was also emphasised that “[NPA 
focuses on] assistance solidarity rather than charity” and that NPA envisioned participation in 
demining in several locations around the world (p. 2). However it was made clear that for NPA 
to manage this and “develop a comprehensive approach”, the Operations Section needed to be 
expanded and improved with regards to finances and human resources (p. 5). It was even hinted 
at NPA moving into Victim Assistance, stating that as part of a comprehensive approach “the 
introduction of the WHO community based rehabilitation of the handicapped will be a natural 
component” (p. 5). (Madsen, 1994) 
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NPA started its Mine Detection Dog (MDD) programme in Mozambique at the end of 
the year, but experienced great difficulties in identifying local personnel suitable for training as 
dog handlers. This was the first case of NPA using dogs in a Mine Action programme and was 
part of NPA’s evaluation programme of new methods in demining, funded by the MFA. Later 
on dogs became one of the three main tools in NPA’s Mine Action toolbox together with 
manual and mechanical demining.  
During 1994 $10.000 got lost from the NPA safe and at the beginning of 1995 one 
expatriate had to leave due to financial irregularities20.  
3.2 NATIONALISING – 1995-1999 
1995 
In the 1995 project document sent to the MFA, NPA put a clear focus on the establishment of 
an “indigenous demining capacity”, with “competence transfer on all levels” and saying that 
“NPA will employ Mozambicans in all HQ positions, deploy local supervisors in all platoons and 
train Mozambicans as paramedics” (Bach, 1995, p. 2). The project document estimated that by 
the end of 1995, the field operations should be able to function without any expatriates directly 
involved (seven were estimated necessary for various monitoring). The whole operation was built 
on the supposition that once a national mine clearance organisation was established, the NPA 
organisation would be included in this. It was discussed how NPA demining could best be linked 
with the government structure. But since there was not yet a clear entity to relate to, the plan was 
to work with provincial authorities and the UN to set priorities. 
United Nations, a difficult stakeholder 
In a progress report sent to the MFA the same day as the project document, NPA stated 
clearly that the continuity and communication in the UN demining organisation had not been 
optimal (Henriksen, 1995). Frequent staff changes and donor discontent made the UN a difficult 
organisation to make plans with. Uncertainty about the promised UN contribution to NPA 
operations, which lead to search for funds from other donors, formed part of the discontent. 
Furthermore, i 1995 UNOHAC/UNOMOZ left the country, UNDP was not able to 
establish a new structure for a long while. This meant for example hat NPA now had to build a 
new system for medical emergency evacuation and set its priorities for demining even more on 
their own. Albeit difficulties with the UN collaboration, NPA worked to keep up a good 
                                                 
20 The two cases were not related. 
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relationship with the UNDP and provide advice on the future organisation of a MOZMAC or 
UNDP supported Mine Action organisation.  
Identifying priority areas came up as a discussion again, as NPA kept clearing areas with 
few mines. In addition some resulted in not being used once demining had finished. NPA 
decided to clear areas around the Cahora Bassa dam which in many ways was a commercial 
project, but which gave the deminers valuable experience and training since it was a high density 
minefield. 
NPA 
On a general programme level the discussion started in March about the merger of the 
two NPA offices (development and mine action) in Tete, at the end of September this merger 
was completed. The idea was to reduce costs and be more coordinated between the demining 
and development programmes. 21 However, that the resident representative left in April 1995 and 
a new one was not employed until much later (June 1996), caused much friction between the two 
programmes in the transition phase (Havik, 1995). Even external visitors noted the frustrations 
in the programme over to organisational problems (Broberg, 1995).  
The deputy programme manager took over the monthly reporting, as the former 
programme manager left for Angola in March to help setup the programme there. A new 
programme manager was employed without the knowledge of and counter to discussions with 
the field staff with regards to qualifications.  HO decisions overrode field preferences and the 
new programme manager stayed for a full year. (Interview 9; 14; 18) 
In the field training of the new local supervisors and work to give them the confidence as 
true supervisors continued. For various disciplinary reasons several were fired. Troubles were 
noted with conveying “moral values” and “sense of duty” to the newly established leaders. The 
year also started with two demining accidents, included one death. Various other local staff also 
left or were fired from the programme making it necessary to recruit and train new personnel to 
maintain the force. The need to continuously re-educate and renew the staff was stated in the 
monthly reports. 
Donors 
Due to the need for long term planning and financing, NPA changed from being funded 
by the MFA humanitarian section and to the NORAD country programme for Mozambique. 
The commercial contractor RONCO pulled out of the country and after long negotiations 
                                                 
21 Whether the merger was solely an initiative of the staff in Mozambique, or an initiative from HO is disputed among the 
involved informants (Interview 10; 19). 
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(including USAID since they had originally funded RONCO) NPA took over the material, 
personnel and dogs left behind. Funding for this additional component was planned to come 
from USAID, NORAD and the Netherlands. Additional funding for NPA activity this year was 
received from AUSTCARE and the Swedish government.  
In the funding proposal for the following two years, NPA laid out its plans to assist 
Mozambique in handling a problem that will last for “decades to come” (Holmegaard, 1995, p. 
3). The objective became to “establish a national capacity to continue mine clearance for as long 
as the need exists in Mozambique”. To achieve this they aimed “to establish either a regionally-
based or several provincially-based non-governmental entities” capable of handling the task.  
Strategies 
Internationally NPA stated in a position paper how “landmine clearance must be 
incorporated in the long-term plans for rehabilitation and development, and cannot be solved 
through immediate short-term assistance” – and that “we therefore emphasise the transfer of 
competence and contribute to establish national organisations and institutions which are suitable 
to manage and implement the landmine clearance on their own and as soon as the necessary 
competence and adequate resources are present” (Bjørsvik, 1995?, p. 6).  
NPA put out a strategy of building competence for the countries to take responsibility 
for their own problem. Because they could not expect that the international society would 
continue to finance and run the demining activities. To facilitate this gradual training of its own 
staff, cooperation with and inclusion of local authorities at an early stage was seen as important. 
Integration of demining with development projects was also raised and put forward as an item 
for future demining projects. (Bjørsvik, 1995?, p. 6) 
This year NPA also started considering mechanical mine-clearance as an option in its 
programmes. However, the position paper noted the danger of too much technology leading to 
further “dependency on international aid”. On a more theoretical level NPA stated that victim 
assistance also was important, indicating it could be an area to enter into and consider where 
NPA already operated. Finally, NPA also declared its new cooperation with the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines.22 (Bjørsvik, 1995?) 
1996 
January 1996 started with the withdrawal of all expatriate staff from the field, leaving the 
responsibility to the Mozambican supervisors. The expatriate advisors were formed into two 
                                                 
22 ICBL is a global network launched in 1992 by NGOs working with landmine victims and demining to, among others; promote 
a global ban on landmines. 
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monitoring teams. They visited the field every second week with the purpose to “advise, carry 
out quality assurance and assist the Mozambicans in management issues” (Hansen & Øygard, 
1996, p. 3). Albeit extreme weather conditions and serious breakdowns of the material during the 
first three months, the system did not collapse. During the year the monitoring team was also 
partly nationalised. NPA cleared 25% more landmines than the previous year while no mine 
accidents occurred. 
In January English replaced Norwegian as language for written communication between 
HO and the programme and some reports were also translated into Portuguese. The monthly 
reports on field operations were from now on only in Portuguese to facilitate their writing and 
reading by local staff.  
A new component was added this year, the Survey Demolition and Reconnaissance 
(SDR) Teams. Delayed due to problems with Mozambican customs, these became operational in 
May. They mainly responded to requests from local communities to clear smaller areas. They 
also became a facilitating team to establish contact with Provincial and District authorities in 
advance of the regular demining teams. 
NPA Mozambique sent some of its dog handlers with dogs to Angola and Bosnia e 
Herzegovina in order to help in the peace keeping operations there; other dogs with handlers 
were lent to the ADP demining operations in the south. 
Strategies 
In the new formal reporting format adopted when the new resident representative 
arrived, the synthesised project objectives were listed as follows: 
1. Develop a human, organisational and operational capacity to sustain mine 
clearance during 1996 and 1997 
2. Address humanitarian mine clearance needs. 
3. Establish a close and efficient co-operation with Mozambican authorities on all 
levels in order to encourage local participaton in fighting the landmine problem. 
(Hansen et al., 1996) 
This was similar to the objectives stated in the Plan of Operation 1997 and the annual report 
issued in December. There the focus on training of Mozambican staff and in particular 
management positions was clear; as well as that NPA would work within the central provinces of 
the country (this is added to item one above). 
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UN 
Finally there was also a formal agreement between NPA and the National Mine 
Clearance Commission (CND/NMCC). With some expectations from NPA that this entity 
might now start working and fill in the vacuum after UNOMOZ left in February 1995. Still, the 
deployment plan was based on discussions with provincial rather than national authorities. In one 
of the three provinces where NPA worked, the province authorities appointed a demining 
responsible who met regularly with NPA, in another the governor declared mines not a problem 
and lets NPA define its own priorities. (Suhrke et al., 1997, p. 81) 
Donors 
From August the Danish development agency, DANIDA came in as a donor to cover 
shortfalls in the 1996 budget. In the project document it was stated that an aim for the project 
was “building up a national institutional and manpower capacity to continue operations [in the 
central provinces] once the NPA project ends” and NPA was to work towards this by decreasing 
the number of expatriate staff “from the original 25 to expected 5 in 1998”. “It is foreseen that 
NPA support on a limited scale will be needed for a consolidation period for a few more years” 
after 1997 (DANIDA, 1996, pp. 1-2).  
The document also stated what had become an established truth and formalised in 
agreements with the IND, that since the attempts at establishing national capacities were not yet 
successful, the country was for now divided in three with regards to demining, HALO Trust in 
the north, NPA the centre and UNs ADP the south.23
1997 
The programme objectives from 1996 remained, while caution was taken to prevent problems as 
in 1996 with regards to heavy rain. Several seminars and planning sessions were held to develop a 
long term country strategy for the period 1998-2002. Among the suggestions was a phase-out of 
the demining programme by the end of that period. Before that the demining part was to be 
more integrated with the rest of the programme, in what was denominated A new human demining 
approach. (Dupont & Ahmed, 1997) 
This year focus was also put on measurement of social impact on the communities NPA 
worked in. One way was through courses for local supervisors to identify the local needs. And 
they established routines to involve Traditional Chiefs in ceremonies before demining was 
started. Involving the locals in this way “contributed a lot to good co-operation regarding 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that this was one of the few contracts written by NPA donors found in the archives that clearly stated the 
objectives and not just referred to submitted documents by NPA. 
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information about minefields” (Muzima, 1997). One of the former SDR teams was reorganised 
to become a mobile demining unit in order to easily respond to incoming demining requests and 
perform surveys. In the Integrated Demining Programme Mozambique, 1998-1997 the plans were 
stated and the key targets for NPA demining would be “the most vulnerable groups”. The 
Objectives were reformulated: 
Long Term Development Objective:  
Sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political/democratic living conditions 
and reduced human suffering from land mine accidents of the targeted population in 
Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces [the central provinces]. 
Immediate Objective  
- Maintain a human, organisational capacity, at the present operational level of 
approximately 560 persons, to sustain humanitarian mine clearance needs in Manica, 
Sofala and Tete Provinces.  
- Further develop and maintain close co-operation with Mozambican authorities at all 
levels to encourage maximum local participation in fighting the existing landmine 
problem, in an environmental conscious manner.  
(Øygard & Muzima, 1997) 
The Integrated Demining Programme was to be evaluated in 1999. It was discussed whether to 
establish smaller decentralised units, in order to operate “directly under and according to” the 
provincial authorities. The splitting up of the demining platoons had already started and no new 
deminers were recruited. However problems were encountered and the need for “strong leaders 
with good managerial skills” was highlighted. 
Work with the Provincial Co-ordinators for mine action was done to define priorities and 
define deployment plans. Mostly NPA found its own priorities and then discussed these with the 
various parties and made an issue out of receiving approval from the provincial authorities 
before starting operations.  
Capacity building 
The NPA programme in general emphasised capacity building in 1997, establishing 
training schemes on various levels of management. Among those were courses for some of the 
superior management to become trainers themselves. It was noted that the remoteness of Tete, 
meant that few training options were available. More remote options for education and study 
visits were implemented. The most remote was an exchange visit to the Mine Dog Centre in 
Afghanistan. 
The work to establish the programme with a national management by the end of the year 
proceeded rapidly. Inclusion of local staff in international strategy meetings was also made a 
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point of, seeing that “the process of being exposed to the International arena, donor 
representatives and reporters is considered important training aspects”(Muzima, 1997, p. 4). The 
programme was however not without expatriates in this period. The expatriate coordinator for 
the dog programme was acting deputy programme manager for the duration that the local deputy 
programme manager served as Acting programme manager. 
In December the national programme manager assumed the position after an official 
ceremony and the Mozambique demining programme became the first Nationalized NPA 
programme. The resident representative (RR) remained an expatriate together with three 
expatriate advisors. Also, as mentioned by the RR when discussing the job description for the 
programme manager: “direct administration and safekeeping of remaining expatriates personnel 
files will be handled by myself in the future” (Hansen, 1997a). 
Unfortunately one local supervisor died in a mine accident in May, 18 months after the 
last accident.  Of other concerns the resident representative on October 22 complained about the 
lack of “attention and support from HQ”. Several issues were raised for the Mine Strategy 
Meeting which was held at the end of that month. (Hansen, 1997b) 
UN 
In 1997 the UN Department of Humanitarian affairs publishes its much cited report on 
The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, where Mozambique was one of the case studies. 
The report listed the politicisation of the process, the persistent desire of the UN for a 
Cambodian style solution albeit donor opposition and the lack of government ownership, as key 
reasons for the failure to develop indigenous capacities. In the study report a key finding was the 
need to redefine the priorities as “activities were not always focused on helping those who were 
most in need”. (Eaton et al., 1997a; Eaton, Horwood, & Niland, 1997b) 
Integrated Demining Programme – 1998-1999 
1998 meant the launch of the NPA Integrated Demining Programme which had a timeframe 
until end 1999. The concept included small scale development activities to be performed 
together with demining to make the side effects of having a large demining team present more 
positive. Activities could be community education, rehabilitation of infrastructure, construction 
of improved traditional latrines and drilling of wells. Much focus was put on the engagement of 
the local communities in both the demining and the development activities. Handover 
ceremonies were conducted where local administrators signed on to the job having been done 
once a task was completed. 
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All positions were nationalised within the demining programme itself; however the 
following expatriate staffs remained in 1999: Resident representative, administrative coordinator, 
logistic coordinator, chief technical advisor (CTA), medical advisor (remained only parts of the 
year) and MDD instructor. 
Re-structuring 
Re-training and new training of supervisors was performed, and new medical personnel 
is recruited and educated, however no new deminers were recruited. The kennel master was 
trained to become a para-vet, decreasing the dependence on an external veterinarian. Computer 
trainings were given to some of the field staff to increase their general competence. National 
management on all levels participated in trainings and seminars both in- and outside the country. 
Work to reduce the size of the demining units was continued in order to make them 
more flexible, this was also a recommendation made in the donor report from March 1999 
(Thue, Jarnehed, Andersen, & Hauglin, 1999). One of the fixed demining groups was reduced in 
size and converted into a mobile team. However, the previously noted concerns about the 
demand for stronger leadership to be able to operate with several smaller units, lead to the 
transition going slowly. In October 1998 discussions came up about the establishment of a 
mechanical demining component within the programme. This was strongly advised against by 
the HO, but brought up again in the donor report from 1999 (Interview 14). 
Some Mine Detection Dogs were retired, reducing the overall capacity of the 
programme. At the beginning of 1999 only 13 of an original 33 MDD remained. Towards the 
end of the year it became evident that the programme was also heavily lacking human 
competence in this area, and it was decided to increase the expatriate presence to have three dog 
instructors. Discussions were also held with regards to how to supplement the programme with 
new dogs. The global market at this time was swamped for suitable dogs. 
Internal disagreement 
A serious difference in opinions occurred between the head office and the resident 
representative. He did not feel that the adequate follow up was given and that he was overrun. 
There were also discussions over the reporting chain and power distribution between the RR and 
the HO. Resulting in that the RR did not want the programme manager to communicate directly 
with the Mine Action desk in Oslo. It also became an issue when the need for renewed expatriate 
presence with the MDD component was seen at the end of 1999. Whether this should be purely 
technical expertise or if a more management trained advisor should be employed. The HO stated 
intention of contributing to competence transfer, was felt as overriding by the RR. Differences 
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were evident over whether to acquire raw dogs and train them in the country, or to wait for fully 
trained dogs.24 Internationally NPA was trying to reach the same MDD standards in all 
programmes and as such the Mozambican decision to train their own dogs was not appreciated. 
Donors 
In the first quarter of 1999 a review of the programme, required by the donors (now 
being Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway), was performed by Agenda Utredning. In 
the Terms of Reference the objective for the study was listed as “to analyse the results achieved 
of the demining undertaken ... to provide basis for a decision regarding continuation, change or 
termination of the programme”. It would, among others, consider results with regards to 
 … the capacity building and its sustainability, including whether the administrative 
routines of the programme have been developed in such a way that a later transfer of the 
programme to a local entity would be possible [and also] asses the administrative set-up 
of the programme with special reference to Mozambican administrative rules and 
regulations.  
(MFA, 1998) 
The report concluded that the NPA operations should continue, with some modifications to the 
“organisation and structure”, for “four to six years within the present NPA framework, and then 
be phased out”. It also made it clear that creation of an independent entity was “considered to be 
neither a correct nor a realistic option”. Notes were made about the lack of support from NPA 
HO, NPA’s vulnerability with regards to loss of skilled labour, the need to downsize the 
structure to fit the tasks, the need to reconsider the community services component and the need 
for more “sophisticated criteria for priority setting”. (Thue et al., 1999, pp. 7-10)  
The donors agreed to most conclusions and e.g. the development or community services 
component was no longer to be funded by Norway (Munkeby, 1999). NPA agreed to and 
followed up on many of the recommendations, however did not fully agree about removing the 
community services component which was seen as a way to establish closer ties to the 
communities where operations took place (Essén, 1999). 
Probably as a result of the report findings, the donors at the end of the year jointly stated 
a concern over the 2000-2001 proposal having a too high Project Related Follow Up 
component. The PRFU was intended to make all NPA project proposals include funding to 
finance support positions at the HO. NPA HO and the Mozambique programme differed in 
                                                 
24 Raw in this sense meaning a dog seen as suited for demining and trained in basic obedience but having no training in detecting 
mines or other explosives. 
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opinion as to how relevant this was, or maybe rather if the money received for this had been put 
to use. 
Local authorities 
In 1999 several important events happened on the national level: For one, the 
government replaced the CND (National demining commission) with the IND (National 
demining institute) subordinating the demining issue to only one (the MFA) instead of seven 
ministries. Second, the Canadian International Development Agency commissioned a Landmine 
Impact Survey (LIS) to assess the situation throughout the country.25
3.3 MATURATION OF THE NATIONALISED NPA – 2000-2003 
2000-2001 
In the plans for 2000 – 2001 continuation of existing efforts was planned. The name of the 
programme was changed from Integrated Demining to Mine Action Programme and focus was put 
on the already started re-structuring into smaller flexible demining units. The plan also had a 
more detailed listing of gender and ecological approaches to include in the programme. In the 
field the result was an overstretched monitoring team that suddenly had to cover 9 field units in 
three provinces which lead to less frequent follow-up. (Muzima & Hansen, 1999) In an attempt 
to counter this, a second monitoring team was established in 2000. From now the “integrated 
demining” part became the Community Services Unit. The priorities for demining were still set 
on a provincial level, and hopes that the IND would become a central entity to define priorities 
were not met. 
Reporting on 1999 it was stated that: “Norwegian People’s Aid has developed the 
routines in such a way that transfer of programme to local authorities is possible in close future”. 
And that: “Local authorities are actively involved in the programme” through assessment, 
implementation and post demining activities. It was also noted that the population in the areas 
where NPA worked more and more saw their own role in the demining. No longer (as they 
could frequently be previously) expecting rewards for providing information on mined areas. 
(Muzima & Tomren, 2000, pp. 1-3,5) 
Furthermore, with regards to community involvement and impact assessment, a study 
was performed by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) on the socio-economic impact of Mine 
Action. (Millard et al., 2000) Among others the researcher spent time together with the NPA 
                                                 
25 This work was finalized in 2001 and in the end disapproved by most actors. 
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Mine Action Programme. When reporting on the country in general the report stated that “The 
lack of coordination between HMA and other reconstruction agencies is, for the most part, 
paralleled with very little coordination between different components of HMA”. It also 
emphasized the fact that the particularities of the problem in Mozambique required a “variegated 
response” with “small-scale, flexible units that can take on random mine occurrences”. While the 
need had been there from the beginning, the report said, few efforts had been made to create 
such capacities. (Millard et al., 2000, p. xiii) As a result of the report, plans were made for PRIO 
to provide training on socio-economic impact assessment and to incorporate this as a general 
feature of the NPA Mozambique programme. 
The MDD programme continued to suffer throughout 2000; hoping for improvements 
in 2001. In particular it was hoped that collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining would improve conditions, as GICHD set up a MDD testing and 
training site together with NPA.26 MDD were seen as a crucial component in the NPA toolbox, 
the manual demining was seen to be much more effective when strengthened by a MDD 
component. Reasons for the problems were quoted as “the dog trainers have limited experience 
in training mine detection dogs within the region” and that the field was new. At the end of 2000 
the programme stated to have “created perhaps the best training and testing grounds in the 
world” (Muzima & Labra, 2001a, p. 5). Unfortunately the right dogs to train were not available; 
the expectations to have 30 operational dogs at the end of 2001 were reduced to 15 in the plan 
for 2002. 
Evaluations for setting up a sup-office in Chimoio in the Manica province were done in 
2000 and the office established in 2001. One of the aims was to improve co-operation with the 
IND and also to have an office closer to many of the field operations. 72 new deminers were 
recruited and trained to replace lost personnel in 2000. 
In April 2000 NPA’s Danish resident representative passed away in a traffic accident in 
Zimbabwe. He was replaced by a new female RR from Latin America. Two demining accidents 
occurred in 2001, resulting in one dead and eight injured local staff as well as four dead MDD. In 
November the deputy programme manager drowned in the Zambezi River. 
In August 2001 the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey was completed. Although 
strongly criticized for its lack of quality (as many areas were declared “mined” that were not and 
vice-versa) the general idea of the survey was agreed upon: The landmine problem in 
Mozambique should be manageable by 2006. No need was seen for the large-scale operations of 
NPA, HALO Trust and ADP after that. 
                                                 
26 It bears to mention that the GICHD representative is identical to the first Programme Manager. 
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2002 
The original plan for 2002-2004 aimed to sustain the efforts. This was changed after the 
Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey finished. Two donor reports, for DANIDA in 2002 and 
NORAD in 2003 (mentioned later) concluded that since the problem was not as big any longer, 
operations should close down by 2006. 
An important feature for the year was the introduction of a “socio-economic impact 
assessment concept into the ongoing operations” (Muzima & Labra, 2001b, p. 8) – “NPA 
Mozambique will not undertake any mine clearance in a given area/road without first assessing 
the social and economic impact aspects” (p. 13). NPA also laid out a plan to re-visit all areas 
already cleared by NPA to do technical, social and economic data collection. The Socio-
Economic Impact Assessment later on changed into the general NPA Task Impact Assessment 
(TIA) approach which was developed simultaneously in the Angola programme and adopted by 
NPA in Oslo as a goal for all the programmes.  
Competence building was still an issue, literacy and other primary courses were 
introduced for field staff; successful students were brought on to the next level. Through 
cooperation with education authorities some of the capable NPA field staff also performed 
literacy training in the areas where NPA operated. (Muzima, 2003b) 
The last fixed technical expatriate positions that had been kept were planned phased out 
by the end of 2002. It remained an option to get this expertise in through consultancies as 
needed (which became necessary for the dog programme). The positions of resident 
representative, Administrative Manager and Logistic Coordinator remained as expatriate 
positions. 
Donors 
In February 2002 a review mission on behalf of DANIDA was performed; as part of this 
an assessment of a suggested new mechanical component in the programme was done. This 
related to the acquisition of Casspir mine safe vehicles following a proposal submitted by NPA.  
The same report discussed the difficulties faced by NPA due to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. A sizable percentage of the staff and work capacity is lost due to this, either because 
of chronic illness or death. In addition established funds for staff illness treatment and funerals 
are being depleted. (DEMEX, 2002) 
Finally, under recommendations for continued support by DANIDA, the report stated 
that NPA should develop an exit strategy “with the aim to hand over HMA capacity to national 
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responsibility and operators”. And that they effectuate their intended reorganisation “into 
smaller and more flexible operating teams”. (pp. 33-34) 
Local authorities 
The IND branch office in Beira started operating and again expectations to a central 
coordination of demining priorities rose (Muzima et al., 2001b). The IND also published the first 
National Mine Action Plan 2002 – 2006 (NMAP), with a “development oriented approach that 
seeks to maximise the socio-economic impact and benefit of HMA” (Scanteam, 2003, p. 7). 
Supposedly through this plan the IND should have been giving priorities and providing for more 
effective targeting of Mine Action. In the NMAP it was estimated that the suspected mine areas 
identified in the Landmine Impact Survey could be reduced significantly. (ibid) 
2003 
In February 2003 a NORAD review performed by Scanteam, similarly emphasised that phase-
out was natural by 2006. Before that the performance of and tools for good surveys would be 
crucial. This would enable the cancellation of areas that did not actually contain mines and 
clearance of the ones with the highest impact. The report estimated a reduction of manpower by 
100 men per year and did not discuss any transfer of assets to a local entity or organisation as an 
end of the phase-out. It was a concern in the report that clearance of mines should happen 
where it had the greatest socio-economic impact. Pointing out that “only NPA is currently 
carrying out work to develop methods to include socio-economic impacts in the prioritisation” 
(Scanteam, 2003, p. 8). This should be coordinated with the IND to avoid duplication of efforts. 
As part of the recommendations the report encouraged the donors to monitor the priority 
setting process more closely and states that “the review team believes that lack of clear priorities 
have had a negative impact on the results of NPA over the last nine years” (Scanteam, 2003, p. 
22) 
As a result of the Scanteam report NPA started discussing how to perform a phase-out 
of the programme and whether to leave something behind. One of the alternatives discussed was 
a small ‘fire brigade’-like organisation, either with a small capacity of some 50 manual deminers 
or a larger capacity including mine detection dogs. An Exit Strategy 2003-2007 was formulated in 
late 2003, planning for the termination of operations by late 2006. The listed reasons for pulling 
out or having reached the end status were:  
a. the scope of the problem had been significantly reduced; 
b. demining was no longer a national priority, and; 
c. NPA’s attention was required elsewhere 
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Under “identificaiton of possible further training areas and jobs...” some intentions for a future 
organisation were stated: “The possibility of starting the [sic] Community based Demining, and 
using some of the leaders as trainers, is currently being considered and will be tested out as part 
of a pilot study” (NPA, 2003a, p. 7). The task of phasing-out was given to the programme 
manager. However, at the end it was considered whether international staff should be employed 
to monitor the implementation of the exit plan. This in order to relieve already highly taxed 
senior management in the programme.27 (NPA, 2003a) 
As a result of decreased funding the community services project (what was previously 
making the programme integrated demining) was closed down in July 2003. A proposal for a new 
project was requested by UNDP, a community based demining project. NPA planned to run a pilot for 
this in February 2004, but did not obtain funding in the end. 
Structural problems? 
From July to October 2003 a British Technical Advisor was with the programme, to do 
an evaluation of the mechanical demining component. In a confidential memo to the HO he 
reported the whole programme to have serious lacks in security, efficiency, administration, 
training, planning, equipment and most importantly chain of command. The final 
recommendation was that management of both the operations and the phase-out should be 
handled by an expatriate staff member with a clear mandate from Oslo. (Williams, 2003) 
A mission performed shortly after by key NPA Oslo MAU staff drew similar (though not 
so negative) conclusions. In particular it identified problems with logistics and follow up of the 
field operations by senior management and advisors. The report from the mission stated that 
“the ‘exit phase’ requires different skills than establishing and consolidating a programme”. 
Especially with regards to the expected pressure from employees and others an international 
programme manager was seen as important. (Bjørsvik, Haug, & Steen-Nilsen, 2003, p. 8) 
Struggles in the programme 
At the start of 2003 the programme experienced delays in operations due to issues with 
the customs. Required equipment could not be brought in under the tax-free conditions 
promised by the government. Eventually the delay in bringing them in caused additional costs of 
about $30,000. The machines brought in also meant new trainings were performed and a new 
part of the organisation created. Unfortunately one of the machines came out of use after 
                                                 
27 The local Programme Manager had already in 2002 voiced desires to leave the programme (Interview 15). 
 
 NPA Mine Action in Mozambique review — 37 
damage from an anti-tank mine detonation. Slow repairs and delayed acquisition of new parts 
meant that the new resource was out of use for a long time.28 In addition the repairs caused large 
non-budgeted expenses. (Muzima, 2003a) 
The dog section continued to suffer and had only 7 operational dogs. NPA Mozambique 
worked hard to obtain and train new dogs. During the visit from the NPA HO mission in 
November it was noted that the dogs observed in the field were not working in the prescribed 
NPA manner. Efforts to bring the dog section up to a relevant standard also caused over-
expenditures. Because expatriate personnel had to be brought in and new physical facilities 
constructed. 
On overall, NPA suffered from a large number of staff being on long-term sick leave or 
struggling to do their job. In addition, during 2003 20 NPA employees died. While it was not 
confirmed for all the cases, it was assumed that a large share of the illness and death was due to 
HIV/AIDS. (Nielsen & Jarnehed, 2004) 
3.4 PHASING OUT – 2004-2006 
2004 
From 2004 a new resident representative was in place together with an expatriate Operations 
Officer (in the summer an expatriate programme manager arrived too) to oversee the phase-out 
and improve the field operations for the remaining time.29 A key task for the Operations Officer 
was to improve the delegation of authority and responsibility. He stayed for the year when the 
position was left vacant as part of the general programme phase out (Interview 14).  
As part of the downscaling and following up on the recommendations given by donors, 
the organisation went from its 15 demining teams in 2003 to only six at the beginning of this 
year. This was reduced further to only three teams at the end of the year. While the manual 
capacity was downscaling the MDD part was planned to expand or consolidate. It was getting 
more dogs and improving quality in order to facilitate surveys. During 2004 the MDD section 
was retrained and restructured to conform to the international NPA MDD standard. 
The IND had stated as a priority from 2003 to get a better picture of the mine problem 
in the country. By this acknowledging that the survey from 2001 did not give a true picture. NPA 
                                                 
28 The Casspir mine-safe vehicles, when fitted with steel wheels, are constructed to withstand anti-personnel mine detonations 
without interruption of work. Detonations from anti-tank/vehicle mines will cause serious material damage and require repairs. 
This means previous survey and assessment of the area of operation is required to as far as possible avoid use in areas with 
such mines. Because only one set of steel wheels had been bought, the destruction of two of the available steel wheels meant 
that both the Casspirs were taken out of operation. 
29 The new resident representative was in fact the same person that led the team producing the NORAD report from the 
previous year. 
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and other demining organisations were therefore primarily given survey tasks as opposed to 
demining tasks; this continued in the period 2004-2006.  
In January 2004, the expatriate Operations Officer reported serious omissions in the 
recording of the surveys already performed by NPA, seeing a danger of having to re-survey areas 
in a short while. The same report also debated how logistics were breaking down and causing 
unnecessary delays and down-time in all parts of the programme. (Kampenhøy, 2004) 
Another TA visit to the programme from June to August 2004 reported that several 
problems pointed out by previous assessment missions and reports had still not been corrected. 
It reported it being a “fractured programme” and that there was a lack of discipline. It was 
suggested that these issues be addressed as part of the re-structuring to occur with the office 
move. (Porter, 2004) 
Donors 
A general review of Danish government support to mine action in Mozambique written 
by COWI gave recommendations to continue support until early 200530. Denmark had been one 
of the donors to the NPA programme in general, and the sole donor for the mechanical 
demining component. The report recommended that a detailed plan should be made to see “how 
the NPA HMA capacity in form of vehicles, equipment and machines, as well as human 
resources will be handed over [to ADP]”. (Nielsen et al., 2004, p. 25) Apart from focus on how 
to best phase-out operations it also said that “The operational organisation of NPA mine action 
was not sufficient in 2003 to manage and coordinate the operations of all deployed capabilities in 
an efficient manner” (Nielsen et al., 2004, p. 19). 
Re-structuring 
In the Annual Report for 2004 it was explained how most problems earlier observed had 
finally been addressed, and that through capacity building of the remaining staff and 
improvement of routines the situation was under control. The new Regional Representative 
analysed that it had been a tough year, but that the situation had “improved significantly”. 31 
(Sekkenes & Gopani, 2004)  
In 2004 the operational headquarters was moved from Tete to Gondola in the Manica 
province. A MDD testing site was maintained close to Tete and another close to Gondola. In 
                                                 
30 Note that this is a significantly shorter period than what the Norwegian report stated – and means an end to funding before the 
NPA exit plan which estimated work until end 2006. 
31 After general NPA re-organisations the Mozambique resident representative became regional representative for Southern 
Africa and responsible also for the programmes in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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addition there was a sub-office in Chimoio city and a management office in Maputo. (Gopani, 
2004) 
As a part of the downscaling NPA released all national staff from their positions and paid 
out compensation packages in 2004. Key staff for the rest of the phase-out process was re-hired 
on short-term contracts. Throughout the year NPA kept loosing and having long term sick-
leaves in significant numbers among national staff due to HIV/AIDS. (Sekkenes et al., 2004)  
Already in 2002 the national programme manager had voiced his desire to end the work 
with NPA, in February 2004 he applied in writing. Two months later he had to leave NPA after 
some irregularities were discovered. 
2005 
The NPA 2005 work plan took into consideration serious reductions in funding; only the 
Netherlands MFA and NORAD chose to continue funding the programme until the end of the 
phase-out plan. As such the work plan had four objectives: 
1. Mine clearance of identified high and medium impact areas, 
2. Technical survey of identified suspected mined areas 
3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) on request and, 
4. Task Impact Assessment of mine affected communities in the three central 
provinces where NPA had been operating. 
Priorities were to be defined in cooperation with the IND regional office and the provincial 
governments. New this year was the clearly formulated plan to support the national poverty 
reduction plan - PARPA32. The main objectives formulated were still the same as before; 
improving the socioeconomic living conditions for target groups.  
By the end of August 2005, all remaining manual deminers were dismissed as part of the 
phase-out. In October the same happened with the staff of the mechanical demining 
component. Only survey capacities remained and efforts concentrated on documenting the work 
that had been done by NPA since 1993. Discussions internally and with donors took place over 
what could possibly be left of the NPA efforts. From the international staff and HO it was clear 
that the initiative to establish a local NGO would have to come from local staff. No such 
initiative came up. 
                                                 
32 Plan to reduce absolute poverty, which unfortunately included no plans or priorities for demining until its final second edition 
in late 2005. 
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Future possibilities in the environment? 
In summer 2005 UNDP ceased its Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). This had 
been imagined as the only large actor to remain when the international NGOs left Mozambique. 
The ADP staff made an attempt to create a new organisation, but did not obtain funding. 
Discussions were also held with regards to transferring the NPA MDD capacity to the 
IND for them to use in QA/QC. (Combs, 2005) The last was strongly advised against after a 
visit from the head of the NPA global training centre (GTC) for MDDs to the current IND 
facilities. Instead the dogs were transferred to the newly started NPA programme in Ethiopia. In 
the report from the GTC it was also noted that the NPA MDD programme in Mozambique had 
“taken a quantum leap” and that “won [sic] may wonder how the MDD history and legacy would 
have looked like if this kind of follow up had happened on an earlier stage”. (Berntsen, 2005, p. 
3) It was made clear that close follow up from the GTC would be required for the dogs to be 
useful in Ethiopia. 
At the end of 2005 the Mozambican TIA personnel was considered an asset to NPA 
internationally. The national TIA responsible in Mozambique was used in other NPA 
programmes to build TIA competence throughout 2006. 
2006 
2006 started with yet another national management member resigning, the then deputy 
programme manager and highest ranking national employee. 
Further discussions occurred between the NPA and the MFA as to possible continuation 
of the organisation. But again it stranded with the local staff and national authorities desiring 
continued NPA presence. The local staff “would prefer to work under the NPA umbrella as it 
will provide easier access to funds and quality assurance”. (Essén, 2006, p. 6) 
As NPA finished the work to survey and document their work in the central provinces at 
the end of April, it was decided to perform surveys of areas previously cleared by ADP in the 
south. This was done in order to provide as good a picture as possible of the situation for the 
IND since the ADP had ceased operations. 
Two visits by HO staff noted problems with how the NPA surveys were performed, and 
deficiencies and difficulties in the planning. Some of the problems were caused by the survey 
teams no longer being manned with staff that had competence in all clearance methods. To solve 
this they suggested close follow up through visits from NPA’s international TIA expert, the 
international technical consultant for digital issues and possibly using personnel with experience 
from other NPA programmes. (Essén & Steen-Nilsen, 2006; Steen-Nilsen, 2006)  
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Some concerns were also noted with regards to confusion around the position of the 
acting deputy programme manager. By this time both the international programme manager and 
the former national deputy programme manager had left. Not having a new job description had: 
. . . made it difficult for him in some cases to know clearly what his role is and what 
under [sic] his responsibility. This has also been made more difficult by several 
international experts coming and going with not always well presented ToRs for the 
DPM, [sic] It has also not been done a proper job in clarification of the reporting lines 
which can be a bit difficult with reporting lines to both the Regional Representative and 
the MAU in Oslo.  
(Steen-Nilsen, 2006, p. 2) 
The last report also made it clear that no real options for halting the phase-out plan existed. IND 
had no true plans and lacked a management that dared make decisions as with regards to a 
national take-over of the efforts, UNDP was overworked and last: NPA itself was on a general 
level moving efforts out of Mozambique and over to South Africa. However it is stated at the 
end of the report that “there is clearly still a need for a MA clearance operator in Mozambique 
and NPA has unique knowledge and experience to operate in the country and could therefore 
still do a very good job if so desired” (Steen-Nilsen, 2006, p. 5).  
One of the very last events to occur with regards to what will happen with the NPA 
programme in Mozambique, was that the deputy programme manager at a meeting in Oslo in 
August 2006 came forward with ideas for an independent NGO when NPA is to leave the 
country finally in October/November. However he made it clear that for it to work, a close 
relationship with NPA Oslo would have to be kept. 
3.5 HISTORY SUMMARY: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND  SUSTAINABLE 
CAPACITIES 
The history of NPA in Mozambique is a history of technological transfer from a highly advanced 
environment to a pre-industrial society where national authorities had collapsed. It tells about 
obstacles encountered and how the decisions made to solve them led to later consequences. It 
also tells about how on the way the desire for a more permanent transfer of capacities evolved, 
out of a powerplay between the various stakeholders. The power of the different internal and 
external actors changed over time and contributed to the changing goals. 
As stated, it is not possible to say that one factor was the reason, but several interrelated 
factors contributed. I use the following table to describe the organisation in the various phases of 
mine action in Mozambique. 
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 Emergency 
1993-1995 
Nationalising and 
consolidating 
1995-2000 
Maturation and 
phase out by NPA 
2000-2006 
Development 
2006- 
(An imagined 
organisation) 
So
ci
al
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Strong formal 
military structure. 
Establishment of 
desired behavioural 
structure demanding 
much attention from 
expatriates 
Formal structure 
loosening but 
maintained. 
Expatriates leave 
formal command 
but maintain in 
practice. Structure 
complicated by 
introduction of 
MDD 
Further loosened 
structure and 
complexity as TIA 
and mechanical 
demining is 
introduced. 
Expatriates retake 
more control 
towards the end. 
 
Small local structure 
receiving advice and 
being monitored by 
NPA 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 
EOD trained expats. 
Demobilised 
soldiers with little or 
no education. 
Fewer and more 
broadly educated 
expats. Large scale 
capacity building of 
local staff.  
Expats present for 
short term 
engagements. 
Several key local 
staff lost. 
Expats come in 
towards end to take 
more control. 
Locals in all roles – 
expats coming in for 
consultancies when 
requested. 
G
oa
ls
 
Demining for 
stabilisation. 2-3 
years of expat 
presence. 
Handover/integrate 
with UN. 
Demining for 
reconstruction. NPA 
presence to build 
local organisation. 
Demining for 
reconstruction and 
development. 
Downscale – 
handover to 
authorities? 
Small scale demining 
where most needed 
in accordance with 
PARPA II and NPA 
surveys. 
T
ec
h
. 
Manual demining Manual demining. 
MDDs 
Manual demining. 
MDDs. Mechanical. 
Task Impact 
Assessment 
Manual demining. 
TIA speciality? 
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
UN DPKO. Non 
existent government. 
Weak district 
authorities. 
MFA as donor. 
HALO Trust 
UN DHA and 
UNDP.  
CND. Several new 
donors. Established 
routines with 
provincial 
authorities. 
ADP, HALO Trust. 
IND with UNDP 
support. 
Fewer donors 
towards the end. 
ADP, HALO Trust 
Government/IND 
as donor and tasking 
authority? 
Handicap 
International. 
Military demining? 
Table 1: Organisational elements and factors in the different phases 
 
While not being perfect and having many defects, the organisation created was arguably 
one of the best “in the class” in a brand new field. As the goals changed and the technology 
changed the organisation eventually faced an environment where it possibly no longer has a 
place. The following chapters will seek to identify and analyze the factors involved using the 
organisation theories explained in chapter 2 and attempt to provide an answer to why it is 
 
 NPA Mine Action in Mozambique review — 43 
difficult to see an organisation independent of NPA being left behind and why the organisation 
created at times struggled. 
 

Chapter 4 
4 Analysing the case 
The following analysis uses the theories presented in chapter 2 to organise and analyse the 
findings of chapter 3. This will suggest answers to what prevented the creation of sustainable 
capacities and identify the factors involved. 
4.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
In order to solve the task given, emergency demining, a group of Norwegian military engineers 
set up an organisation with a structure based on Scandinavian military structures. Through a 
strong expatriate presence this was up and running within an impressively short time33. It was 
possibly the best solution at the time and was not intended by its main creator to become an 
independent indigenous organisation (Interview 18). However, the social structure chosen gives 
explanations to why it was difficult to turn the organisation into a national sustainable organisation, 
or an organisation nationalised as far as possible.34
An unfamiliar structure 
The social structures established in Mozambique were similar to those found in Western military 
organisations and bore little resemblance to non-military social structures found locally at the 
time.35 It was a large military organisation fit for large-scale demining operations, action oriented 
and with clear command structures.  
It is claimed that suitable local organisation structures were sought for, but not seen as 
suitable (see The possibilities in the local environment, p. 60). As a result, NPA had to work hard to 
imprint the normative structure required to get the organisation to work; first in the training of 
the deminers, later in the process of training supervisors and senior management staff. On the 
way several local staff were found unsuitable and fired for not conforming to the desired social 
structure.  
The military structure can have been a reason for the difficulties in reforming the 
organisation into a more flexible entity with several small units. By some informants it is 
                                                 
33 Informants hold that the percentage of expatriate staff was much less that other comparable operations at the time, such as the 
UN. 
34 Håvard Bach upholds the importance of distinguishing these two. I’ll leave the discussion over what the goals were to NPA 
and its donors and merely note that whichever was the goal, from the material reviewed and people interviewed it seems like 
the organisation created, albeit helping significantly in solving the landmine problem in Mozambique, did struggle at times. 
35 One informant inquired that in general the organisations created by NPA are not really well made military organisations. 
Arguing that few of the organisers had a high military rank and were not trained in building military organisations. (Interview 
13) 
46 — “Sustainable Capacities” 
suggested that the military structure should have allowed for exactly this division of the forces. 
This need was identified early by NPA and later on in donor reviews. Still, it took years to 
accomplish, possibly the lack of suitable local personnel made it difficult. In the end, my 
knowledge of military structures and what actually happened is too vague to be able to say 
something definitive about this. 
From interviews and documents reviewed, it appears that the social structure established 
tended to become relaxed and inefficient with time. Possibly it was adapting to more local social 
structures under local leadership. Towards the end of the programme, several concerns were 
noted that related to the established social structure collapsing (Berntsen, 2005; Essén et al., 
2006; Kampenhøy, 2004; Porter, 2004; Steen-Nilsen, 2006; Williams, 2003). This could also be a 
result of the structure having been weakened as key national staff had left the programme (a 
danger noted already in the 1999 donor report). If important parts of the structure were not 
formalised, but rather imprinted in and dependent on participants, this would be to expect. 
It has been suggested that an approach were local social structures are studied in 
advance, and combined with the desired levels of security and standards, would provide a 
stronger and longer term structure. While deeper analysis of the local culture and identification 
of suitable local social structures might be difficult in an emergency context, it would certainly 
pay off in a development and capacity building perspective. 
Expatriate dependence and moving from manager to advisor 
In the beginning, with around 30 international staff members the programme was largely 
dependent on the expatriate staff. The nationalisation aimed to establish the local leaders and 
managers as legitimate. However, local managers were always controlled or monitored by 
expatriate staff in some way. Even if local managers had the responsibility, they had to take 
advice from expatriate staff. As one informant said; “they [expats] came in and held the steering 
wheel themselves whilst telling the locals to drive” (Interview 17). Hence whether they were ever 
truly in charge is in question. It is difficult to conclude that full control should have been handed 
over, considering problems discussed above regarding availability and training of local staff. 
Several informants pointed out the possibility that the wheel was actually handed over too 
quickly, with the wrong or too little follow-up (Interview 9). There are problems related to this 
that also relate to the goal setting and power structures, as well as corruption, which will be 
discussed later. 
Several informants have cited the problem for expatriate staff to move from a manager 
role to advisor. While many of the expatriates might have been excellent managers and 
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technically skilled, good in a supervisor role, they might have failed in becoming good advisors 
and teachers of more advanced matters (Interview 8; 9; 13; 17). Equally, the time available was 
never enough for the local leaders and managers to build the necessary self-confidence to fully 
take-over the organisation. When key persons trained disappeared the organisation struggled due 
to its informal structure and lack of head office suppor. New strong management had not been 
recruited, nor could be recruited from the local community. 
The long-time local programme manager has pointed out as a considerable source of 
frustration the frequent changes of technical advisors and other expatriate staff (such as resident 
representative and Administrative Manager), with different cultural backgrounds and opinions on 
how to solve matters. Initiatives by technical advisors, who were on the ground for a short while 
and possibly had no interest in the long term goals of the programme, became his responsibility 
and he was blamed when they were not successful. (Interview 15) 
Towards the end, it was realised that the programme was struggling without expatriate 
management. Especially as a tough change process was to be implemented. Key positions were 
again, possibly a bit too late according to the former local programme manager, staffed by 
Norwegians. While this was needed to improve the situation of the programme, it was also done 
as a clear step to facilitate the phase-out. Not in an effort to lay the ground for a sustainable 
organisational structure. Actually it was a reversion of the formal structure established to 
promote local management of the organisation. 
Summarizing the social structure 
The social structures created were not known in the local society and depended much on the 
expatriate presence and individuals. Within the short timeframe of the demining programme, it 
was not possible to convey and imprint the imported structure required for the organisation to 
function independently. 
4.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Informants have stated that NPA had “luck” with some of the local and international staff 
recruited (Interview 6; 19). In a difficult environment, with a loose and weak structure of NPA 
mine action internationally, little support from the Head Office in Oslo and the fact that the 
social structure created was informal and unknown in the local environment, the dependency on 
individual capacities has been strong.36  
                                                 
36 One former desk officer holds that he intentionally employed strong leaders (whom he knew personally) and gave much room 
for them to decide in the field. (Interview 17) 
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Availability and selection 
Local staff 
As a result of UN requirements, NPA had to start out with primarily demobilised 
soldiers as a basis for its demining teams. It was considered a good idea by the UN, donors and 
NPA alike at the time to keep the soldiers “off the street”. Today many informants see this as a 
reason for later problems. In an environment where the educational level was generally low, 
these were the least educated persons (Interview 6; 18).37 While many of the ex-soldiers worked 
well as deminers, problems occurred later when the recruitment of supervisors was based on 
deminers. It was easier to recruit administration employees, but also had to be recruited in an 
environment were few educated people were available. That NPA had located its operation in 
Tete decreased the numbers further because of its remoteness. At the time of start-up several 
other organisations were establishing themselves in the area and there was a big demand for 
educated labour.38
Particularly the Mine Detection Dog programme NPA suffered. The keeping of dogs as 
domestic animals, even less to train them, was unknown to most Mozambicans. Hence to obtain 
qualified personnel with the personal affection required was not easy. It is clear from documents 
and interviews that a fully independent MDD capacity in Mozambique would have been 
extremely difficult to establish. 
A former expatriate programme manager in Mozambique expressed great difference in 
the quality of local managers and commanders recruited when he managed the programme in 
Angola. He then knew Portuguese and recruitment was done on the “open market”. Knowing 
the language meant that he himself could assess the quality of the personnel and whether they 
possessed the required leadership qualities or not. (Interview 9; 18) 
Loosing the good ones 
There was a continued loss of educated staff throughout the history of the organisation. 
Due to the harsh conditions in Mozambique with issues such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, traffic 
accidents, climate as well as the frequent loss of staff that broke the rules and norms established 
in the organisation.39 Staff also left for other jobs (Interview 12; 14). 
In the last years, the more important national management persons left for various 
reasons. It appears that the behavioural structure of the organisation became weaker. Some 
                                                 
37 In the later rounds of recruitment NPA asked for a larger selection of demobilized soldiers to recruit from, something that 
improved the quality. (Interview 18) 
38 Many of the informants have expressed that it would not have been right if NPA had absorbed all of these, since it might have 
hampered other development in the area. 
39 In the early monthly reports there are several incidents of local staff being fired for disciplinary reasons. 
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informants have suggested that the recruitment and training of senior management slowed down 
or halted under national management.40 It is anyway a stated concern by former and current staff 
(both local and international) that NPA had no clear policy for further advancement of local staff 
after they had reached top management positions. As they all knew by 2000 that a phase out was 
imminent, they had less incitement to stay. 
NPA identified the possibility for a lapse in morale and the need for a good human 
resources policy early on. But it appears that no actions were taken early to counter this and 
ensure key national staff had motivation to stay and do a good job for the organisation.41
International staff 
In the beginning, NPA had no technical expertise and little staff in Oslo to handle the 
rapid needs for new staff. Recruitment policies and routines were non-existent or very weak and 
so clearly some of the staff recruited, should not have been employed (Interview 9; 14; 17; 18). 
The focus was on technical expertise with regards to explosives and demining rather than 
competence in organisation development and building of strong management. Few or none had 
knowledge of Portuguese, and could therefore not communicate directly with the local staff they 
were to work with and educate. The general profile of the “recruits” was: male around 30, often 
with little experience abroad, low military rank and trained to lead small units at home. Suddenly 
these came in charge of up to hundreds of men from a completely different culture (Interview 9). 
While efforts were made by NPA field management to educate expatriate staff members with 
undesired attitudes and behaviour, it seems clear that the local population and staff were at times 
appalled by the demining staff (Interview 10; 11).  
Many of the informants question what the alternatives should have been. Their opinion 
is that in what they were set to do, the ex-military staff “did the job” in a very hard environment. 
And few others achieved similar results with regards to time spent and areas cleared. This study 
has been too superficial and my experience in the field is far too light to say how it could have 
been done better. With what was known at the time and the lack of standards, what was done by 
the staff in Mozambique seems to have been among the best solutions in the world for. 
However, it also seems clear that several lessons were learned that should not have to be 
repeated. 
There were also cases where the bad recruitment policies and internal politics of NPA led 
to employment of unsuitable expatriate managers (Interview 14; 18). Fortunately for NPA they 
                                                 
40 They are not blaming the local management for this, but seeing it as a lack of follow-up from the head office. 
41 Policies for the expatriate staff might not have been better, but NPA has had a spirit and attitude which has attracted and kept 
a considerable force of highly qualified personnel. Management in Oslo today sees a need for better follow-up of both 
international and national staff, but due to lack of resources it is still struggling to implement its intentions. 
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had also recruited some expatriate staff that had wider competencies and worked to counter the 
lacks of others. Questioning of the NPA recruitment policies came back in various interviews; it 
has improved lately but still needs improvement.  
 
A last problem is that once it was realised that participants were not suitable for the 
organisation, they were hard to get rid of. Both with regards to local and international staff. The 
NPA background in the Norwegian labour movement meant that concerns for employees at 
times led to decisions that were not for the best of the development of a strong organisation. 
Why were the participants so important? 
While some remarkable persons were employed, the organisation suffered from scarce 
availability of qualified personnel, the later difficulties in managing these, the frequent loss of 
trained personnel as well as frequent changes of expatriate staff. With an informal structure, 
where much was imprinted in individuals, it was hard to build a strong organisation. 
The fact that it remained as long as it did, must be credited to a few capable local and 
international staff members on the ground. 
4.3 GOALS AND POWER 
“The problem for mine action is that, over much of a programme’s life cycle, the 
attention is not on development but on other related yet different, goals. These goals 
include humanitarian assistance, peace-building or reconstruction of essential 
infrastructure. As a result, the mine action programme may not be linked early and 
strongly with developmental actors, particularly within the national government, who 
eventually will assume control of the country’s development agenda. If this happens, the 
profile of the mine action programme will almost certainly suffer, along with its 
funding.” (Paterson & Filippino, 2006) 
NPA Mine Action in Mozambique had frequently changing and vague goals, varying over time 
and space depending on when and who you ask. While this to some extent is normal, it is 
problematic if an organisation is to be established and develop an identity. 
I will now review the goals of the various actors, external and internal, and how they 
have affected the goals NPA in Mozambique. 
Norwegian People’s Aid 
To illustrate and explain the ambiguity in how NPA relates to the landmine issue a quick return 
to history before the Mozambique case and how NPA became a mine action operator will be 
clarifying. 
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NPA in the 80s and early 90s was an organisation generally refraining from relief aid and 
humanitarian emergencies, concentrating on long term development aid and work with partner 
organisations.42 In 1992 Jan Egeland, then State Secretary in the Norwegian MFA, visited 
Cambodia and saw the horrors of landmines. Not particularly content with the UN and having 
little faith in its capacity to build an operative demining capacity, he had the idea to create a 
Norwegian demining organisation.43 Funded by the MFA and with staff mainly recruited from 
the Norwegian army the organisational anchorage would be with one of the “big five” 
Norwegian NGOs.44 All five got “the offer” but only the then head of NPA’s international 
department saw an opportunity in the field. Albeit serious possibilities for the whole project to 
have gone seriously in Cambodia from the start (again due to variable recruitment and follow up 
from NPA), it became a success (Interview 14; 19).45 From there the move to Mozambique was 
natural, NPA saw a new field where it received much positive attention and actually made some 
profit. (Interview 17; 19; Filippino, Wheatley, Paterson, & Lambert-Madore, 2004, p. 66; King et 
al., 2005, p. 293) 
The move into demining happened quickly and without much discussion in the 
organisation as a whole. In just a few years NPA had a portfolio of large operational demining 
programmes in several post-conflict countries. In Mozambique NPA employed and was 
responsible for several hundred individuals, expatriates as well as nationals. The mother 
organisation was only sparingly expanded to cater for the expansion, both in terms of resources 
and ideology. A conflict occurred over the build-up of a professionalised operative section to 
handle the new demands of the demining programmes; a strife which has not been solved and 
with regular intervals returns. The Mine Action weight on “getting the job done” and the 
development approach of “getting the job done the right way” have always collided, in addition the 
professionalisation meant a distancing from the membership base of the organisation (Tranvik, 
2007 forth.). In many regards the new activities went contrary to the NPA philosophy, with 
focus on solidarity (working together and both parties growing) as something different from 
charity (pacifying with giver in control).46 The inbalance in the relationship, the fact that the local 
                                                 
42 However at the same time the history of NPA as the Norwegian labour movement’s aid organisation shows several occasions 
of grass root enthusiasm and individual initiative sprouting projects where the NPA HO policy would not have allowed action. 
The desire to help when help was needed and one could provide has often caused internal divergence and conflict. 
43 Quite an interesting stand considering his current position as head of UN OCHA. 
44 Norwegian Red Cross, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council and Norwegian People’s Aid. 
45 Resulting among others in a call from the UN Mine Action responsible Paddy Blagden to the head of NPA international 
department stating that NPA was the only organisation doing something good in Cambodia: “you clear mines, the others kill 
people” (Interview 19). 
46 “Solidarity means supporting groups so that they themselves may have the opportunity to protect and promote their own 
interests. Solidarity is the opposite of charity. Whilst charity implies that the giver has control over the recipient, solidarity 
means showing respect for the partners’ integrity and their right to set their own conditions.”(NPA, 2003b) 
 
52 — “Sustainable Capacities” 
counterparts are fully dependent on NPA as benefactor, is seen as a dilemma by several of the 
informants.  
The Mozambique programme is an illustrative example of this. In a way the original idea 
of NPA building up an operational organisation to be handed over, then later only to provide 
technical input (as had been done in Cambodia) became confused by development ideas and 
desires to “build something” (Interview 1). The 2003 Scanteam report stated: “NPA’s goals are 
too fuzzy and non-committal, which makes it difficult to evaluate and assess its effectiveness, 
efficiency and actual achievements” (p. 22). 
Donors 
I have also mentioned that donors, in particular the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
affect the goals of NPA demining and vice versa. NPA could not define its goals in Mozambique 
without consent from its main donor, nor could the MFA define its policies without inputs from 
the technical expertise of NPA (Interview 5) 
While other donors were added to the NPA Mozambique programme, the MFA 
remained the most concerned and committed donor. However, the MFA person responsible for 
the programme in Mozambique changed frequently, and the possibility for good follow-up can 
be questioned. Most MFA staff work on a rotation, 2-3 years is considered long time. 
Discussions during the establishment and the first years were frequent. Later, when the MFA got 
involved with regards to the goals, it was mostly through proxies. Research teams were engaged 
to do an evaluation over a couple of weeks. Reports were produced and often resulted in new 
MFA policies and requirements for change. Several informants and sources listed it a key 
concern that the donors did and do not engage profoundly in the goals and objectives for the 
Mine Action activities that they fund. (King et al., 2005, p. 297) 
For the MFA and other government donors there is also often an agenda of “political 
demining”. The fact that in a post-crisis situation it must be shown that things happen on the 
ground, that the suffering is being alleviated and that there is a point in maintaining the peace. 
That it happens fast is then more important than whether everything is happening in the best 
way and if it is suited to become a sustainable activity. This was a goal which NPA fulfilled in 
Mozambique and it seems to have been repeated with the Norwegian efforts in Sudan. 47 
(Interview 5; 9) NPA’s demining capacities can be said to form part of the Norwegian 
government’s “peace package” in international politics. It is not unlikely that Norway and other 
                                                 
47 Norway played an active part in the peace process between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/SPLM in the south. The 
startup of demining quickly after peace agreements was one of the Norwegian “contributions”. 
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donors had further underlying political goals; of for example influence in Mozambique and the 
region, as reasons for supporting mine action. 
At times it also appears that donor goals, possibly out of lack of knowledge, lead to the 
implementation of activities that the NPA HO did not see as viable for the Mozambique 
programme. In particular this relates to the start-up of Mechanical Demining. The HO had 
expressed clear concerns that this would be too difficult with the existing organisation and 
conditions. However, DANIDA had received recommendations that Mechanical Demining 
would be good and thus funded this effort in the end. Later reports indicate that this complex 
technology was too much of a strain for the organisation, and required a huge effort from the 
HO in order to work at all. 
United Nations 
NPA started the organisation as a part of the UN peacekeeping operation. NPA Mine Action 
staff had UN ID cards, the cars used UN license plates and UN logos for the first two years. The 
aim was clear in the beginning (at least for the field staff): NPA was only helping the UN for a 
short while and would then pull out. As such the UN goals what had most significant influence 
in the first years. It is clear that the UN was a rather schizophrenic “beast”, several entities and 
personalities fought to define the goals. In the end UN desires to control and run the whole 
country as one (with regards to demining) was turned down by the donors, leaving the UN in a 
somewhat defied state. From the interviews it appears that the UN representatives at several 
stages were told by donors that their work was much less worth than what NPA was doing. 
While it on the ground and in one part of the UN was clear that they needed all the support they 
could get from NPA, the ones higher up in the system could not see the dependence nor accept 
a too strong NGO. Seen by NPA there was a fear within the UN in New York that an NGO 
might take the coordinating role and the UN loose fame, which might have led to the decision 
not to use NPA as implementing partner to establish the national coordination (Interview 10; 
18).48  
At the same time, once there was an option for NPA to join the UN effort it was also 
clear that NPA did not see the plans as interesting, due to lack of competence and UN 
disinterest with the NGOs. But possibly this was also because NPA had a desire to build its own 
organisation (Interview 17; 18). 
                                                 
48 The lack of UN sources for this analysis should be noted. 
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The later ambiguity of the UN effort and the lack of success in establishing a capable 
national coordination led to further frustrations for NPA and needs to reassess efforts and to 
create a more independent organisation. (see “1996” p. 25). 
Government of Mozambique and other authorities 
What has maybe become clearer over the last years to all actors in mine action is the fact that the 
principal output of demining (safe land) should not be the “end in itself”, rather it is a means to 
an end, to “support the most strategically important efforts under way in the country” (Paterson 
et al., 2006). Hence the focus on recipient government ownership has become important (Paterson, 
Lardner, Rebelo, & Tibana, 2005, p. ix). While definition of priorities and clearance goals in the 
emergency phase could and possibly should be done by outsiders, it should be done by a national 
authority on behalf of the government in the later stages. This will be fundamental to ensure that 
demining serves the general development goals of the country. 
Unfortunately the government of Mozambique (through its CND and later IND) never 
reached the level where they were able to define goals for the mine actors. What goals NPA 
received were disregarded as they did and still do not correspond with the realities (ICBL, 2006; 
Interview 22). The lack of clearly and realistically defined goals by the GoM is one of the key 
reasons for why donors refuse to fund any more demining in Mozambique. It was only after 
much pressure from donors, Mine Action operators and the IND itself that demining was 
included in the government’s key document for future planning (PARPA II). (ICBL, 2006) 
I will discuss the weakness of the GoM in Mine Action further in chapter 4.5. 
Individual and organisational goals 
While there are certainly other stakeholders to the NPA operation in Mozambique influencing 
the organisations goals (maybe unfortunately some that influenced in the least degree were the 
ones most in need of the organisations help) I will mention one last group of stakeholders before 
I sum up. Each and every individual in an organisation has their own goals, which the wide array 
of understanding of the goals in Mozambique among the informants shows. Individual goals, or 
motives as some choose to say, decide why the different participants choose to join an 
organisation. It would be highly naïve to believe that the local staff that joined the organisation 
because they were interested in ridding the world of landmines. They did so because it was the 
alternative which at the time corresponded the most with their own goals of personal security 
and a steady income. Similarly only few on the technical experts employed by NPA are 
concerned about the deeper humanitarian goals of NPA as an organisation, they take an 
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interesting job with a fair pay. Once the goals of the organisation no longer coincide with the 
personal motives they will leave the organisation as many have done. 
Before donors choose to fund an independent effort based on the organisation NPA 
created in Mozambique they will seriously consider whether this is based more on the motive of 
continued employment of the staff and the desire for continued international funding by the 
government. If they feel that these outplay the goals that they would like to see, of truly solving 
the remaining problem, they will not continue funding. 
Cathethic goals 
My review of NPA in Mozambique has listed a host of participants with a multitude of goals that 
have varied over time. The following table identifies assumed and generalised (all the 
stakeholders could be further divided) motivational goals of the most important stakeholders; 
these are their reasons to contribute to the organisation. Whoever had the most power at any 
time, alone or in a dominant coalition, decided what common goals were to be prioritised and acted 
upon. Some stakeholders have had a vetoing power and as such defined NPA’s room to 
maneuver. 
This table is speculative in the way that I am trying to guess true goals, based on 
discussions with informants and archive information.  
 
 Emergency 
1993-1995 
Nationalising 
1995-2000 
Maturation 
2000-2006 
Post NPA Power 
NPA 
Members  
“solidarity across borders”, sprout similar organisations around 
the world 
medium low 
little direct 
influence 
NPA HO 
MAU49  
 
Enter new field, 
gain 
international 
and national 
credit, positive 
financial 
outcome 
Develop 
international  
capacity, 
explore new 
methods 
Maintain 
well running 
capacity 
Ensure good 
reputation 
after exit. 
medium high 
Implementation, 
defines strategies 
and selects staff. 
Provides tech. 
advice to donors. 
                                                 
49 NB! A clearly defined and internally accepted MAU did not exist until 2001. Before this mine action staff belonged to the 
various country desks. 
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NPA HO 
LTD 
Help in crisis – 
work with locals 
as much as 
possible 
Work to develop local organisation? Long 
term capacities to contribute to development 
Medium 
Often RR has 
development 
background or 
wider views and is 
more steered by 
dev. section. 
NPA 
expats 
New job, 
exciting 
experience, 
master 
something large, 
personal 
development 
Short term 
experience, try 
new things 
Gather 
experiences, 
maybe help 
some. 
 High – medium 
Implement the 
projects on the 
ground take daily 
decisions. In early 
days with weak 
MAU had defined 
policies. 
NPA 
local staff  
Employment, personal development.  Run an 
organisation 
that is seen 
as credible 
by donors in 
order to 
receive 
funding. 
Low – receive 
employment and 
give some skills 
back. 
Donors/ 
MFA 
Stabilise 
country. Create 
Norwegian 
capacity. Show 
public in home 
country that 
government is 
helping 
Development in country. 
Ensure efficient use of funds 
Funds given 
only if well 
used. 
Vetoing - High 
Holds the funds, 
no funds means 
no activity. 
UN 
(could be 
divided 
into 4-5 
entities) 
Stabilise 
country, clear 
mines as fast as 
possible, keep 
control and do 
“by the book” 
Create national 
capacity, keep 
UN 
control/coordi
nation 
Try to 
develop 
national 
coordination
.  
Move to 
other arenas 
international
ly. 
Vetoing->low 
Held funds, 
initially controlled 
the country. Lost 
donor faith and 
control in the 
country. 
Moz 
governme
nt 
no goals Employment 
through UN 
funds. 
Activity. Get 
funds of 
customs 
scheme. 
Equipment 
for personal 
use? Keep 
funds 
coming. 
Medium high 
Can deny access 
to areas or the 
country. 
Mine 
affected 
societies 
Avoid accidents. 
Get money for 
information 
Avoid accidents; get access to mined areas; 
general development. 
No power 
Table 2: Stakeholder goals and power over time 
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How did goals and power influence? 
In a rapidly changing environment, with an informal structure and missing or ambiguous overall 
policies defined by the head office, the decisions on goals for NPA in Mozambique have 
depended on individuals. With mine action not fitting in with the overall strategy of the mother 
organisation, the organisation created has also been influenced. Policies have been “squeezed” 
between development and mine action, and were never well defined or viable for concrete 
action. This resulted in unfeasible long-term goals and the mid-term goals being vague. 
The remaining local staff, who will now have to set the goals for a future organisation, 
never took true part in the definition of goals and the plays for power among the stakeholders 
earlier. Hence for them to write a credible strategy for the new organisation, to be accepted by 
the other stakeholders, will be a challenging task.  
4.4 TECHNOLOGY 
The technology of humanitarian demining is very much affecting the other aspects of the 
organisation. What personnel was recruited (both local and international), the structure chosen as 
well as the goals made depend on the technology in use. The technology itself was “brand new” 
in 1993; military demining had been happening around the world since mines were invented but 
the humanitarian demining approach was something new (Interview 6). If we exclude the actual 
picking of the ground, the technology involved has evolved incredibly over the past fifteen years. 
There was no ready made technology that NPA brought to Mozambique and trained the locals 
in. It was a case of two-sided learning where the expatriate staff learned and found solutions that 
were simultaneously conveyed to their local counterparts. Early focus on demining being 
something new, technical and short term meant that earlier learning and mistakes from 
development aid were overlooked in the first years. Later on the perspectives have been changed 
and the realisation that for many countries it is a more long-term problem, has meant that the 
part of the “technology” that regards impact assessments and making sure that the “right job is 
being done” rather than the “job being done right” has received much more focus. (King et al., 
2005, pp. 305-334) 
Manual Demining 
The actual technology used in the field when demining is not a hard technology to learn and 
master. Most demining programmes start with a two-three weeks course for local recruits with 
no background. What demands attention are the stringent rules and operating procedures to 
ensure safety and quality of the work performed. Logistics to ensure the smooth operation and 
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deployment of several hundred deminers is the next concern; this as well as tracking of what they 
do and ensuring that they do clear mines where demining is most needed appears to be where 
the difficulties enter. 
The organisational structure required to manage this first simple technology is what NPA 
spent the first couple of years to construct (seems to have been rather successful at as proven by 
several reviews); we could say that this is the core technology of NPA. However, it appears from 
reports that when there was less expatriate presence the adherence to the normative structure 
also relaxed. 
Mine Detection Dogs 
The introduction of MDDs to Mozambique was something completely new to NPA at the time, 
Mozambique became a laboratory and a starting point for many of the later NPA MDD 
programmes. It was a technology in development and being self-critical NPA staff state that they 
are seriously concerned about the quality of their first five years of dog use, in all their 
programmes (Interview 6). With both the technology being new and undeveloped, as well as the 
use of dogs as domestic animals being something unusual in Africa, it appears logical that NPA 
struggled with this technology in Mozambique. While the dogs were seen as critical to the quality 
and speed of the demining programme it appears never to have been running smoothly even 
with expatriate presence (Interview 22). 
Mechanical Demining 
Mechanical demining of various kinds is used by NPA around the world as a supplement to 
manual demining and MDDs in the NPA “toolbox”. In Mozambique the NPA Head Office 
made it clear that the complexity made it uninteresting, however the programme still acquired 
machines that remained a headache until they were sold in 2005. Being self-critical HO staff 
admits that possibly early close follow up from the HO could have improved performance 
(Interview 14). That still makes it clear that the complexity was too much for the local 
organisation to handle without expatriate support. 
Task Impact Assessment 
The introduction of TIA (see page 32 about TIA and socio-economic impact) meant another 
level of technology was added to the NPA operations. While certainly considerations were made 
earlier as to prioritising what land to clear, the TIA meant something different. A whole new set 
of criteria for assessment of the situation in the mined communities before, during and after 
demining were applied and supposed to be followed up on. While clearly a useful tool the 
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approaches, an actual move over to sociology, meant a completely new “technology” for the 
young organisation to learn and incorporate. In later reports several important features of TIA 
(like proper recording of information) unsurprisingly appear to have been overlooked without 
expatriate presence.  
On a positive note: the local TIA responsible in Mozambique is often referred to as one 
of the world’s top TIA experts. Possibly indicating that in this field NPA managed to transfer 
capacities or develop them in union with the local staff. However, it would remain a question 
whether this is still tied to one person and that the loss of this person would mean the loss of the 
capacity. 
How has technology affected the organisation? 
The technology chosen in Mozambique was intended to handle a large scale problem in a quick 
manner with a large influx of funds. It was not adapted to a small scale approach with less 
expatriate presence, and huger demands on individual capacities in the local participants. This 
and the introduction of new, complex and interdependent, but widely different technologies 
increased uncertainty and put a large demand on the organisation. At the same time the 
necessary increase in capacity for information processing was not done (ref. p. 10). As a result 
the performance and quality was lowered. 
In the end it appears that, albeit the intentions were good, the standards and technologies 
adhered to are made in a Western mindset and that they (as the head of the NPA MAU writes 
and was discussed at the NPA MA programme manager meeting) maybe become “externally 
managed, too-complex and thus pacifying mechanisms for mine action rather than assisting in 
the creation of nationally adaptable, appropriate and sustainable measures to solve the problem” 
(Nergaard, 2006).  
4.5 ENVIRONMENTS 
NPA entered Mozambique under challenging conditions in 1993 and quickly created something 
functional were others, in particular the United Nations, failed in many ways. Although attempts 
were made to engage seriously with both authorities and a somewhat malfunctioning UN 
operation, a setup was chosen or rather evolved in the end, based on the desire for cost-
efficiency and productivity that made a somewhat independent organisation which worked well 
under expatriate leadership. As repeated by its main “creator” the organisation was never 
intended to become a local, independent entity; it was created to solve a short-term problem – 
which most agree it has done – and then disappear. He argues that while it lasted a bit longer 
 
60 — “Sustainable Capacities” 
than planned it now retreats because the problem has been solved. (Interview 18) Regardless of 
this later managers and donors have inserted words like “sustainable capacity”, “indigenous 
organisation”, “transfer of programme to local authorities” etc. in the plans for the organisation 
and have had a desire to “leave something behind” and make a sustainable, positive impression 
for the local environment in other ways than just the removal of mines. 
Let us analyse why the environment at various stages did not provide a good situation for 
this – the creation of a local organisation. I will also introduce some of what informants have 
said could possibly have been done differently on the way to facilitate this. 
The possibilities in the local environment 
The capacity of a population to develop and support special-purpose organisations is 
determined by such general factors as widespread literacy and specialized advanced 
schooling, urbanization, a money economy, and political revolution. 
Stinchcombe in (Scott, 2003, p. 153) 
Clearly few or none of the factors listed above were to be found where NPA established its 
operations in 1993. In accordance with general NPA policies the demining teams should have 
found local counterparts in the country to train and thus enable them to perform the necessary 
job themselves. Some evaluations of this were done, of for example educating the military to 
train a demining capacity. But apart from fears of corruption the fact that the country did not 
have a formal military but rather two opposing forces that might go to war again made it not an 
option. 
Society at large at the time had little to offer in terms of an educated work force, 
organisational freedom had been declared in the country only few years before and the concept 
of organisations was not known; at least not in the main areas of operation where NPA had to 
establish its operations50. If again some capable persons were to be found many of the 
informants have declared it possibly unethical for NPA to absorb these for demining when other 
parts of society might have benefited from them. Still, in a way this was the case with NPA’s 
national programme manager who was one of few in the area with a higher education; he went 
from the ministry of health (where he was working to establish the local health structure) to 
NPA hoping to get better conditions (Interview 15). 
Corruption 
The fear of corruption has been an everlasting concern in the NPA programme. With a 
government in the country that is clearly corrupted, it is hard to see NPA handing over anything 
                                                 
50 One informant suggested that locating the operations closer to the capital could have made the task easier. 
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to the government with an easy mind. For NPA employees it has seemed that the concern of the 
individuals representing the government is more about “when do we get the keys to the cars” 
than the desired “how we will be running the organisation once you leave”. (Interview 3; 18; 22) 
While NPA worked hard to imprint a normative structure in its own organisation to counter 
these problems it was hard to make this work in a highly corrupted society once the close 
monitoring by someone removed from the local society disappeared; “the international 
connection is a way to shelter against the temptations and the pressure from family, friends and 
other locals” (Interview 19). 
Many new NPA projects are based on cooperation with governments51, for the 
Mozambique case, as it looks today it is doubted whether this is feasible. Donors also see this 
and the fear for corruption is one of the key reasons why they will not continue funding mine 
action in Mozambique. 
Engaging the environment 
Local communities 
Several actors have claimed that the early NPA Mine Action programme in Mozambique 
interacted badly with or overrun the local communities where they performed demining, 
particularly in the first years (Interview 10; 11; 22). The participants that were on the ground 
strongly contest this and insist that serious efforts were made in advance of all operations to 
survey the areas and enter into a dialogue with the local authorities and communities52. While this 
was certainly improved on and more organised later on they feel that the intention strongly was 
there (Interview 14; 15; 18). This study has not been profound enough nor intended to make a 
clear opinion about the question; however the difference of views is noted and the importance of 
relating to the local environment clear if a sustainable impact is sought. 
Once the UN inputs on tasks and priorities disappeared and no national authority was 
yet established, NPA went into dialogue with the provincial and district authorities as well as 
military authorities. While it was not seen as important for good input on priority setting, it was 
regardless important to establish a good relationship. 
Later in the programme a point was made of involving the local communities with their 
traditional rituals and structures in the demining process. Getting such formal approval in 
advance and recognition once the work was finished is noted frequently in written reports. 
                                                 
51 For example Jordan, Ethiopia and Thailand. 
52 They confessed a feeling that others envied them because they had succeeded where the others had not, as being the reason for 
the claims (Interview 14; 18) 
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Government of Mozambique 
The government of Mozambique never really got involved with the landmine issue. And 
as many informants have said – why should they? The government has had several critical issues 
at hand of which landmines was only one; one which they saw to a great extent being solved by 
international actors. There was never a need to take responsibility for the landmines too.53
This is where current trends in mine action say that a new policy is required. Yes it is a 
good idea that one should help a weak government that has enough other issues to handle, but 
the government “ownership” of the problem needs to be clear. Only in this way can it be assured 
that the demining efforts are put to use where the country needs them the most, in order to 
ensure development and poverty reduction. And only in this way can the problem be solved fully 
since international donors are seldom interested in funding all the way until the last mine is lifted. 
In practice the GoM has caused more problems than it has solved, e.g. the cases of 
customs retaining vital equipment for long periods and costing lots of money should clearly not 
have happened had the government been truly concerned. 
Prioritising where demining is required, with a good understanding of the problem 
should have been the GoM’s task by now. However this never happened and as such there is 
also little room for an independent national operator to operate and define its own priorities. 
Little less chances are there of the government financing demining by an NPA offspring through 
its regular budgets. 
While agreed that the mine problem is not close to as severe as before, donors and 
NGOs alike agree that there is more than a “residual” problem left in the country and that a 
capacity is needed to handle this. When they are no longer willing to stay to finish, or fund the 
reasons are most often due to the lack of concern shown by the GoM. 
United Nations 
NPA has a philosophy of collaborating with the UN. As it states in its 2004 portfolio: 
“NPA coordinates its activities with those of the UN where they are present, through assisting 
the organisation and coordinating mine action related activities in the field” (NPA, 2004) This 
desire for coordination notes a difference between NPA and several other large international 
Mine Action NGO’s who consider UN coordination a negative influence. 
                                                 
53 A question raised which I have not entered into is whether the internal politics and tribal structure of Mozambique play a role. 
It has been indicated that the areas around the capital and other areas were rapidly cleared. This could relate to tribal patterns 
often seen in Africa where the ruling tribe will tend to care for its own, and leave the rest of the country to cater for itself.  
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The first couple of years in Mozambique the UN was a main part of NPA’s environment 
– NPA Mine Action in Mozambique was part of the UN and conceived as such in the local 
environment. The UN defined the areas to clear and the desired capacity of the NPA forces.  
On the ground and in operations NPA seldom had problems and cooperated closely 
with the UN during the peace-keeping operations and the later established training centre, 
providing key advice and inputs as well as material facilities when possible.  However it seems 
clear from the history that the consistence and clarity of the UN leadership was dubious leading 
to slow action on behalf of the UN (Eaton et al., 1997b; Interview 14; 18). At several stages 
NPA, with the support of its main donor the MFA, went contrary to the UN when they felt the 
need for it. This could have been the cause for some later problems, having caused, as one 
informant indicates, hostility towards NPA among key UN staff (Interview 10). 
The discussions about NPA possibly taking on a coordinating role for all operative mine 
action in Mozambique appear to have been serious and well considered by NPA, donors and the 
UN representatives in the country. However, international UN politics meant that decisions were 
made that NPA could do nothing about. As demining in Mozambique was moved from the 
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to DHA a wholly new attitude was shown, 
by people who did not have knowledge of the actual situation in the field. 
Had NPA been in an overall co-ordinating role it would have had better chances at 
influencing the environment and would have been part of the more clear effort to create future 
indigenous capacities. Whether they would have succeeded any better is a different matter, but it 
bears to consider the fact that donor support (a key environmental factor) for the NPA plan was 
much stronger than it was for the final UN plan for a Mine Action Center (which was not 
approved). 
Donors 
The main reason for NPA to pull out of Mozambique is because there is no more 
funding for its project and this is also the main reason for why the intentions of the local staff to 
create an organisation (with strong NPA follow-up) probably will fail. The donors frequently 
state the need for “indigenous” organisations and initiatives. But when it comes to the point, the 
fear of corruption if no international organisation is involved appears to prevent funding. While 
it might have been a better long term solution to attempt “education” of the government, for it 
to take responsibility for the problem this is much harder to find funding for (Interview 5). 
Many of the “twists and turns” of the NPA programme in Mozambique can be 
accredited to the various donor reviews and assessments. While this is natural, the actual 
involvement of the donors in the goal setting and visions for the organisation can be questioned. 
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Short reviews without continuous follow up from donor representatives might not be all that 
helpful and rather damaging in definition of goals. 
NPA – an ambivalent organisation 
After I have followed the organisation NPA over more than ten years the clear ambiguity 
and wide array of interests, goals and visions are impressive. Under the slogan “Solidarity in 
Action” the organisation includes all from first-aid in Norway, immigrant social events, anti-
racism advocacy and international development work to mine action; distinguishing itself from 
other similar organisations by taking a political point of view. Clearly the organisation struggles 
to keep it all unified under one roof. 
As discussed under goals, the changing courses and varying views, in short: the 
development of NPA in Mozambique must also be said to relate to the varying inputs from its 
mother organisation. Starting out as an initiative by ex-military personnel with little or no 
relationship to NPA and little understanding of its principles and development objectives the 
organisation later had to adapt to some of the NPA philosophy (Interview 1; 18). 
However, the clouding with development and the political approach – the continued 
forcing of the demining people to relate to development and vice-versa – might be what 
contributes to NPA’s strength and the donor confidence in NPA work internationally (Interview 
5). 
Last, the fact that NPA has a rather weak hold on its programmes means that a lot 
depends on local initiative of the managers in place (Interview 9). In a development programme 
where partners are the most important this might work, but in the demining work with large 
operational organisations in greatly varying environments it seems evident that a clear sense of 
direction from the home organisation is vital. This is something that NPA has started to address 
the last years, in an environment where the Mine Action Unit, to the dismay of other parts of the 
organisation and the former secretary general and head of international department, has grown 
and tried to establish the strong central organisation they feel required for their activities 
(Interview 19).  
The “business” environment 
Over the past years the “business” of humanitarian mine action has expanded 
significantly. A wide array of experts, institutes and organisations opine about the best ways to 
perform demining.54 While much is certainly good and diversifying it can be of serious challenge 
                                                 
54 As does this thesis... 
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if a weak local organisation is to critically choose and assess the best inputs. For NPA as an 
organisation a key feature has been to pick-up the best and most vital input from the 
international environment (and to some extent coordinate the international business); then 
integrate best practices into their country programmes and design the overall goals (even if they 
have struggled somewhat). This strength can clearly not be expected of a local demining 
organisation. 
Why is the environment so critical? 
A difficult environment in the start-up phase, led NPA to make certain necessary choices 
for the creation of the local organisation. The choices made had consequences for how well the 
organisation created was able to function independently later on. With the current high rate of 
corruption, it is hard to see how a successful hand-over to local authorities (the goal in early 
strategies) can be accomplished. 
Several stakeholders in an asymmetrical power structure, and the choices made with 
regards to how NPA and other international actors engaged local stakeholders, led to 
differentiated power structures and can to some extent explain the passivity of the local 
environment today. 
 
 

Chapter 5 
5 Final summary 
I have told the history of NPA in Mozambique and analysed it using organisation theory. 
Through this I sought reasons for why the organisation created by NPA in Mozambique did not 
become a “sustainable capacity” and why it had some struggles on the way. While certainly 
individual capacities have been transferred and the problem to a large extent has been solved, the 
larger whole of the organisation and the technological advance it constituted, most likely 
disappears as NPA leaves the country. 
 
If we look at the social structure there are some key factors that affected the outcome. The 
structure created in the start-up phase revolved around the importance of and dependence on the 
expatriate staff. This never changed, the local Programme Manager employed from 1998 was 
responsible, but had to take advice and directions from local expatriate administration and 
Technical Advisors. In addition the informal structure (if we look away from the actual 
technology surrounding demining) depended on strong individuals, when these left the 
organisation suffered. 
Establishing the structures needed for an organization of the dimensions we talk about 
here takes time. NPA did credible attempts at imprinting the necessary values, norms and role 
expectations and creating a common way of thinking and behaving; but this was not feasible 
within the timeframes given by the donors. 
 
While some remarkable persons were employed, the organisation suffered from scarce availability 
of qualified personnel, the frequent loss of trained personnel as well as frequent changes of 
expatriate staff. With an informal structure, where much was imprinted in individuals, a weak 
human resources policy from the head office caused problems. 
 
The goals of NPA Mozambique and NPA in Mozambique have changed frequently and been 
influenced by many along the way. From desiring to only build an emergency capacity to be taken 
over by the UN within two years, to building a long term demining capacity to aid general 
development. However logical and understandable this is, it has been hard for a fresh 
organisation manned with a newly trained staff to cope with. 
In a rapidly changing environment, with an informal structure and missing or ambiguous 
overall policies defined by the head office, the decisions on goals for NPA in Mozambique have 
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depended on individuals. With mine action not fitting in with the overall strategy of the mother 
organisation, the organisation created has also been influenced. Policies have been “squeezed” 
between development and mine action, and were never well defined or viable for concrete action. 
This resulted in unfeasible long-term goals and the mid-term goals being vague. 
The remaining local staff, who will now have to set the goals for a future organisation, 
never took true part in the definition of goals and the struggles for influence among the 
stakeholders. Hence for them to define a credible strategy for the new organisation, to be 
accepted by the other stakeholders, will be a challenging task.  
The government, who should be acting on behalf of the affected population, never took 
a responsible role in goal setting. 
 
The technology first chosen in Mozambique was intended to handle a large scale problem in a 
quick manner with a large influx of funds. It was not intended for a small scale approach with 
less expatriate presence and huger demands on individual capacities in the local participants. This 
and the introduction of new, complex and interdependent but widely different technologies, 
increased uncertainty and put a large demand on the organisation. At the same time a necessary 
increase in capacity for information processing was not done and as a result the performance was 
lowered. 
The high standards set for the technology, much as required by western security norms, 
that the local environment is not able to support. This means that they make the organisation 
dependent on external support. 
 
Due to a difficult environment NPA had to make certain necessary choices for the organisation 
they created to function. The choices made had consequences for how well the organisation 
created was able to function independently later on.  
The most important reasons for the NPA operation in Mozambique being discontinued 
and having had problems along the way is that the government did not take ownership and is 
very corrupt. The ability of expatriate staff to withstand pressure for corruption will be higher 
than someone living in and depending on the local environment.  
 
All in all the factors of social structure, participants, goals, technology and environment together 
explain why it was hard to create an independent organization in Mozambique based the first 
organization NPA created as an emergency response.  
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Taking this into consideration NPA has suggested a three pronged approach for future 
mine action programmes. Three separate paths (and by that organizations sought created) are to 
be followed: One emergency response, one approach to work with the government to establish 
permanent structures owned by the government and one to work with local communities to help 
them reduce the suspected areas in a safe manner and by that “own” the problem themselves 
(and be independent of corrupt governments). 
 
The case studied in this thesis is the story of a fairly efficient organisation created to help a 
country recover from a crisis and succeeding in this. On the other hand it provides perspectives 
on how the transfer of technology between different environments can be difficult. 
Building of mine action capacities is part of general recovery and technological 
development of the developing countries in question. While the main goal is demining, it would 
be bad if none of the capacity to manage large organisations remain and contribute to general 
development. 
5.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES  
While performing this study there were various foci of study that were considered and imagined 
as I progressed, but not found to fit in or be feasible to include within the time frame.  
• A further study of how the goals in NPA evolve and how the power structures and the 
play of the dominant stakeholder coalitions influence, involving use of postmodernist theories 
of social situations. This would also help in analysing the apathy seen by recipients of 
development aid and assess how the level of empowering of the recipients of mine action 
would be crucial for local ownership of the problem. How can the ones in need of mine 
action be empowered to make sure that they get the help they need? 
• With the help of organisation theory an analysis of NPA as a whole, encompassing all its 
various activities in Norway and abroad, should be useful to NPA but also provide 
insights into the development of organisations in general. 
• A study of the organisational learning capacities of the local organisations created by 
NPA. 
• Drawing further the connections with literature on technology transfer in business and 
development/capacity building theory while keeping an eye on the differences involved 
in the asymmetrical power situation at the basis of development aid. 
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• Studies of the development of the various technologies for demining – how did the technology 
become as it did and what drives the development? 
• On a more ethical level: to what extent can the millions spent on research and 
development in new methods for demining be justified? What are the important 
developments in demining research and development and how adaptable are they to the 
field? 
• With regards to innovation: how has Mine Action contributed to and played a role for 
development in the countries where it has been implemented? Has the effect been 
positive or negative? 
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 Appendices 

Appendix 1 NPA Mozambique Timeline. NB! This is not intended as an accurate presentation of the various actors and events. It was an aid to the author while working and can possibly assist the reader too.
Anonymized Participants 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
NPA General programme 
actions Moz
RR to Maputo. Jan-Feb: Fact F. Mission. 19.04: 
UNOHAC Project doc. 29.nov: MFA application states 
"duration of project assumed until end 1995". NPA 
advances funds missing from UNHCR as these funds 
are not yet provided by UN.
Dec: Discussions on future for 
programme: a. NPA pulls out end 95. B. 
NPA continues
UN Financing dissapears 
as UNOHAC/MOZ leave. 
Mineaction and dev get 
joint administration.
First "long term" 
(two years) plan 
written. Apr 4: 
Signs agreement 
with CND
4. dec 
handover to 
local PM
1st q rep: 
"terminated several 
contracts due to 
severe misconduct"
10/14sep:Request for 
Advisor on other matters 
than technical ones. July:
Maputo office opened. 
Agenda report.
NORAD delays 
disbursement of 
funds until June
Moves to 
Chimoio
Programme 
closure
Other Dec. first policy doc on demining by H.Hoksnes No res. rep. until Uffe arrives in 1995
25 mar: moz 
programme 
participation in fact 
finding in Sudan
Discussions of PRFU 
costs with donors.
HQ events
MA handled 
by 
Operations 13. Dec: Laila requests mine expert at HQ
April: Nicolaisen disc study on Moz take-
over with UN. Oct.: UNOHAC requsts 
proposals for MOZMAC
Per Nergaard arrives as 
reinforcement of MA
ICBL 
conference 
in Oslo. 
Joins ICBL 
board/CC
Mine Action Unit 
mentioned in letter 
14.sep99
Mine Action Unit 
Established
Mozambique mine action in 
general Nov 93:UN national mine action plan signed. UNOHAC leaves country
July: CND disolved, IND 
created.
LIS finalized, donors 
start going.
International events Nobel Prize GICHD created GICHD functional
NPA Persons Involved
NPA Oslo
Norwegian male
Norwegian male
Norwegian male
Norwegian male
Norwegian male
Norwegian male
Norwegian female
Norwegian female
Norwegian female Desk Oslo?
Norwegian male,mil
Norwegian male Desk July
Norwegian male
Norwegian male Desk?
Norwegian male Desk from Nov
Norwegian male,mil Admin Moz
Norwegian male,mil Admin Moz
Norwegian male,mil ??
Norwegian male,mil "PM" Moz
Expats in programme
Norwegian male,mil NPA Camb
Norwegian male,mil NPA Camb Prepare operations with H Bach
Norwegian male,mil
Norwegian female, dev NPA Harare international 
Norwegian male, dev
Norwegian male, dev
Chilenean female, dev
Norwegian male, mil, war ac. Dep PM until June Desk
Norwegian male, mil, war ac.
Norwegian male, mil, war ac. Supervisor Moz Angola
Norwegian male, dev PM
Norwegian male
Norwegian male Admin
Norwegian male, mil Ops Off
Norwegian female
Peruvian male
Mozambicans recruited
male
male
male
male DPM
MFA/NORAD Persons 
Involved
Jon Lomøy Desk
Bjørg Leite
Clarisse Barbosa Emb Map
Tove B Westberg Emb Maputo
MFA/Neth
Anita Conjin Desk emb. Map Desk emb. Map
Willem Aalmans Desk emb. 
Frieda Nikolai Desk 
Danish Emb
Ester Lønstrup Desk emb.Map
UN
Andre Millorit
Patric Blagdon
Wolfgang Scholtes
Bernt Bernander Director UNOHAC
Stephen Ransley
Aldo Ajello
Deputy PM? Until he drowns in 2000
DPKO head of demining
Desk Moz from March 2000
Res Rep from late 1995
Res. Rep
NPA Camb - fact f miss jan feb 93
From Oct/Sep 2003 RR
Res Rep Tete
Res Rep
Survey responsible?
Emb Moz from 1991
From june 1995: Dep PM
Desk Moz
PM from July 03-Jan 06->UNDP
PM from dec 1997Starts as translator then advances in system.
DPM/in charge as national - leaves jan 06
Logistics
TIA Angola Desk - Politics
Special representative for the UN Secretary General to MOZ
Arrives to setup MozMac in August.
UNOHAC - MA CTA
Deputy director UNOHAC
Desk from March 1994
PM/Team Leader
Desk Moz Dev. Issues
Acting RR Horn of AfricaConsultant to angola and moz
Desk
PM Angola Desk Sudan
Desk - Head of MAU from 2001?
Desk Moz dev issues
Head of International Dep Secretary General NPA
Deputy Head MAUDesk
Special advisor Dev. HOHead dev unit 
Desk Ops. Acting head Ops unit from april 1994 Res Rep Angola
PM Angola GICHD
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APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEWS 
The interviews were performed in Norwegian (apart from those marked with *) and 
recorded, then transcribed directly to English. Audio files have been saved for all except no 15. 
+ Denotes interviews where additional information has been added later. 
No Name Date Years involved and 
Position(s) held 
Interview details Pgs
1 Atle 
Karlsen 
25 July 
2006 
Management consultant NPA. 
Wrote report for NORAD in 2003. 
RR 2004-2006. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO. Very loose 
interview guide. 
5+ 
2 Henrik 
Forsberg 
Mathiesen 
26 July 
2006 
Desk officer MA Middle East Interviewed at NPA 
HO. Very loose 
interview guide. 
6 
3 Aksel 
Steen-
Nilsen 
27 July 
2006 
NPA Angola. Consultant to NPA 
Mozambique and responsible from 
HO for phase-out in 2006. 
Interviewed through 
Skype. Recording 
failed/is bad. 
Rather loose 
interview guide. 
5+ 
4 Adam 
Combs 
8 August 
2006 
Current deskofficer for Angola and 
Ethiopia. Deskofficer NPA Moz. 
for some months in 2005 
Interviewed in 
person at NPA HO. 
More clear interview 
guide from this 
point.. 
5 
5 Steffen 
Kongstad 
9 August 
2006 
Department of UN, Peace and 
Humanitarian Affairs. MFA. 
Involved with mines from 1995. 
Interviewed in 
person at his office. 
Tailored interview 
guide for MFA 
6 
6 Steinar 
Essén 
14 August 
2006 
Current deputy head NPA MAU. 
Supervisor in Mozambique in 1994. 
Desk officer NPA HO at various 
stages. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO. Two audio 
files. 
8 
7 Harald 
Smedsrud 
17 August 
2006 
Current desk officer Cambodia, 
Laos. Desk officer MA 1995-> 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
6 
8 Åge 
Skagestad 
18 August 
2006 
Resident rep and development 
programme responsible NPA Tete 
1990-1995. Cambodia 2000-2002. 
Currently controller at NPA HO 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
5 
9 Arne 
Øygard 
19 August 
2006 
PM Mozambique 1995-1997. 
Consultant to Angola programme 
and other NPA programmes in 
Africa 
Interviewed at home 
in Sandefjord 
6+ 
10 Laila 
Nikolaisen 
21 August 
2006 
RR Maputo 1993-1995. Various 
other management positions in 
NPA, development educated. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
8 
11 Eva 
Haaland 
25 August 
2006 
Desk officer Mozambique/Angola 
from 1995 to present. Development 
responsible. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
6 
12 Håvard 
Hoksnes 
29 August 
2006 
Desk officer NPA operative 
department 1992-1994. RR Angola, 
currently at Norw. embassy Angola 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
7 
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13* Luke 
Atkinson 
31 August 
2006 
HMA from 1994. Started in HALO 
Trust and has worked with NPA, 
Danish Church Aid and has worked 
in Angola, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan and Jordan. Setup 
NPA programmes in Sri Lanka, 
Sudan and Jordan  
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
5 
14 Geir 
Bjørsvik 
31 August 
2006 
Currently in charge of NPA 
international monitoring concept. 
Deputy PM Mozambique 1995. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
8+ 
15* Filipe 
Muzima 
1 and 6 
September 
2006 
National PM Mozambique 1998-
2004. With NPA Mozambique from 
1993 
Interviewed by 
Phone. No 
recording due to 
technical issues. 
Several later 
discussions. 
7+ 
16* Felix Andre 1 
September 
2006 
Deputy PM Mozambique Jan 2006 
to present. Joined NPA 
Mozambique in 1995. 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
4 
17 Svein 
Henriksen 
4 
September 
2006 
Desk officer MAU 1994-1998. The 
first technical expert at NPA HO 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
9+ 
18 Håvard 
Bach 
5 
September 
2006 
1992-1993 Cambodia 
1993-1995 PM Mozambique 
1995-99 Angola 
Later GICHD 
Skype interview 
recorded in three 
files. 
17+
19 Halle Jørn 
Hansen 
5 
September 
2006 
Head of NPA international 
department 1992-1995. Secretary 
General 1995-2001 
Interviewed at NPA 
HO 
6 
Informal interviews, talks and e-mails providing important input and being used as references. No 
recording. 
20 Kristian 
Berg 
Harpviken 
14 
February 
2006 
PRIO Talks at his office in 
Oslo 
 
21 Steinar 
Essén 
February 
2006 
NPA MAU Talks at NPA HO  
22 Sara 
Sekkenes 
July 2005 
and 24 
February 
2006 
Current UNDP, former NPA 
MAU. TIA “inventor”, NPA 
Angola and PM NPA Mozambique 
2004-2006 
Conversations in 
Mozambique and 
phone call. 
 
23 Bjørg Leite 19 
September 
2006 
Royal Norwegian Embassy in 
Maputo 1991-1995. Currently 
ambassador to Uganda.  
E-mail 
correspondence 
 
24* Ted 
Paterson 
 Head, Evaluation Unit GICHD Various e-mail 
correspondence. 
 
 
 
